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In The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase firmly installed 
transaction costs at the center of the economic analysis of law.
1
 The 
potential for these costs to inconveniently interpose themselves between the 
world as we know it and an ideal of perfect efficiency has provided 
generations of law and economics scholars with an analytic north star.  But 
the relationship between property rights and transaction costs is a 
fundamentally unstable one. Property rights seem to be an antecedent to 
transactions,
2
  yet property can also be viewed as an invention necessitated 
by transaction costs,
3
 or as an input into the magnitude and composition of 
transaction costs.
4
 To think about property and transaction costs together, 
then, is to confront a conceptual Möbius strip.
5
  Isolating and addressing 
transaction costs turns out to be a slippery business that can interfere with 
the goal of structuring resource access optimally.
6
  For property theorists, it 
is the wrong enterprise.  
Transaction costs are not always, and not uniquely, problematic. Like 
other ways of structuring access to resources, transactions are costly to 
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1 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The Coase Theorem holds that when 
transaction costs are zero, an efficient result will be reached, regardless of the initial assignment of legal 
entitlements.    
2 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 1, at  8 ("It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not 
for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delineation of rights there can be no market 
transactions to transfer and recombine them"); Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS, VOL. I: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 893, 898 (Bouckaert, 
Boudewijn and De Geest, Gerrit, eds. 2000) (“Given that trade is the transfer of property rights, there can be no 
trade (and hence no gains from trade) in the absence of property rights.”).   
3 See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil versus Common Law Property, 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), manuscript at 23 n. 58 (“in a zero transaction cost world, we would 
not need property rights at all”); Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of Coasean Property, 59 INT'L 
REV. ECON. 145, 148 (2012) ("The institution of property is itself a mechanism that enables us to avoid these 
[transaction] costs"); see also infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
4 See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Endogenous Transaction Costs (unpublished manuscript, Jan. 2012). 
5  Some definitions of transaction costs explicitly embrace this entwinement with property rights.  See Allen, 
supra note 2, at 897 (discussing property rights and transaction costs as “fundamentally interlinked” and “two 
sides of the same coin” on the “property right” vision of transaction costs).    
6 The ultimate aim is optimal resource use, but I focus here on the law's role in structuring access as a proxy 
for use. Some complications will be discussed below. See Part IV.C, infra.     
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154069
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produce.
7
  They may be underproduced or overproduced in certain settings 
due to unsolved (or suboptimally solved) collective action problems, but in 
other instances they may be supplied at the efficient level. Because making 
transactions cheaper or less necessary consumes resources that might be 
better deployed elsewhere, we cannot infer inefficiency from high 
transaction costs alone.
8
   
Nor are costly transactions the only source of inefficiency worth 
addressing.  For example, entitlement design choices implicitly subsidize 
certain inputs into resource access, such as boundary protection, which may 
drive a wedge between private and social cost in a way not usually 
associated with transaction costs.
9
 Thus, existing institutional structures 
may raise the costs of resource access even when no transaction is in 
view.
10
 The important question is whether legal changes can cost-
effectively improve resource access. That inquiry proves to be broader in 
some ways, narrower in other ways, and more finely specified than the 
usual focus on transaction costs allows.         
The problem is not ultimately definitional in nature, although widely 
divergent definitions of transaction costs have made it hard to separate 
substantive disagreements from semantic ones. Consider Harold Demsetz’s 
sustained criticism of the central place given to transaction costs in Coasean 
analysis,
11
 and his suggestion that “ownership costs” should receive more 
attention.
12
  This critique (unlike Demsetz’s widely-cited work on property 
                                                 
7 See HAROLD DEMSETZ, FROM ECONOMIC MAN TO ECONOMIC SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 109-10 (2008).  Legal changes may be able to reduce the cost of inputs 
into that production process, but should be pursued only when the cost reductions are worth the price.  See infra 
Part III.A. 
8 Coase himself emphasized that external effects like train sparks do not necessarily signal an inefficiency 
warranting intervention. See Coase, supra note 1, at 18.  Demsetz would extend Coase's point to apply regardless 
of the presence and magnitude of transaction costs, on the ground that too-costly transactions are efficiently left 
undone. See Harold Demsetz, The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. 
Pigou and R.H. Coase, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 10 (2011).   Pierre Schlag previously argued that several points 
Coase made about externalities could be made in an identically structured manner about transaction costs.  See 
generally Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1665 (1989).  Although my 
points and Demsetz's are different from Schlag’s, they find common ground in this observation.   
9 The notion of transaction cost could be cast broadly enough to reach all aspects of property rights, 
including this one. See Allen, supra note  2; infra Part I.B.  But legal scholars do not always view transaction 
costs so broadly.  For example, anticommons theorists have said nothing about the point mentioned in the text, 
despite their intense concern about the implications of property configuration choices for later transactions. See, 
e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999); 
Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 595 (2002).  In any event, simply expanding the 
definition of transaction costs does not resolve the conceptual difficulties flagged here.  See text accompanying 
notes 121-122, supra. 
10 It is true, but irrelevant, that these costs would disappear in a zero transaction cost world because everyone 
could pay the owner to configure optimally.  If costless transactions were on offer, then the mediating institution 
of property would no longer be necessary at all.  See supra note 3. 
11 DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 106-117; Demsetz, supra note 8; Harold Demsetz, Ownership and the 
Externality Problem in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 282 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred 
S. McChesny, eds, 2003). 
12 See, e.g., DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 116-17 (classifying free-rider problems as “ownership costs” rather 
than “transaction costs”); see also Demsetz, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the “positive costs of ownership” in 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154069
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rights) has been largely ignored by property theorists in the legal 
academy,
13
 and for an obvious reason: Demsetz defines transaction costs in 
a manner that is much narrower than most property rights theorists use the 
term,
14
 making his complaint seem uninterestingly terminological. But his 
critique flags problems that are substantive and important. A broader 
definition can indeed bring Demsetz’s “ownership costs” (and much else) 
within the transaction cost tent, but as long as it leaves murky how these 
elements relate to each other and to legal interventions, the confusion and 
incompleteness in the analysis of resource allocation will persist.   
This essay argues that transaction costs (however defined) do not 
comprise a useful category for legal scholars interested in the efficiency 
implications of property arrangements.
15
  Treating them as focal confuses 
the cause of our difficulties in structuring access to resources (positive 
transaction costs) with the solution to the cost minimization problem that a 
world featuring scarce resources and positive transaction costs presents. To 
see the point, observe what the counterfactual zero transaction cost world 
does for us.  Certainly, it ensures that the “things” that property scholars 
focus their attention on—entitlements to emit, pieces of land, water access 
rights, and so on—reach their highest valuing users. But the zero transaction 
cost assumption also, and crucially, means that we need not worry about 
spending too many or too few resources on the transactions that accomplish 
these feats; all transactions are free.  Likewise, we need not worry in the 
zero transaction cost world about keeping things in place when their current 
possessor is the high valuer; the necessary transactions to accomplish this 
will also be costless. 
As soon as we introduce positive transaction costs into a world of 
resource scarcity, we must worry not only about thing-misallocation but 
also about resources being misallocated to structure access to those things. 
To focus single-mindedly on reducing or overcoming transaction costs is to 
miss the significance of the other resource access structures that their 
                                                                                                                            
connection with the existence and enforceability of private property rights); Demsetz, supra note 11, at 284 
(describing his approach as one that not only “argues against the emphasis given by Coase, and now by the 
profession, to transaction cost” but that “also argues that more emphasis should be given to the conditions of 
ownership.”); see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition between Private 
and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653, S655-56 (2002) (observing that Coase assumed the existence 
of private property rights, whereas Demsetz's own work examined the development of those rights).   
13 There are some exceptions. See, e,g., Fred S. McChesney, Coase, Demsetz, and the Unending Externality 
Debate, 26 CATO J. 179 (2006).  Other scholars have engaged related aspects of Demsetz’s recent work.  See, e.g., 
Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 810-16  
(2009). 
14 See Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL. I: THE 
HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 893, 903-04 (Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De Geest, 
Gerrit, eds. 2000); Lee & Smith, supra note 3, at 150. 
15 I am not the first to question the significance of transaction costs.  See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 8, at 1699 
("To treat the presence, absence, and identity of transaction costs as the predicate determination for deciding 
whether to create or supplant actual pricing markets is wrongheaded."); Demsetz, Ownership, supra note 11, at 
284 ("deny[ing] the importance attached by Coase to transaction cost"). 
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presence has necessitated, and the costs associated with those structures.  
For example, the appealing idea that we might reduce transaction costs 
through thoughtful entitlement design must be tempered with attention to 
the converse possibility: that we might pay too much, in the currency of 
entitlement design, to achieve transaction cost reductions.    
 There are three basic reasons that transaction costs comprise a poor 
category around which to organize legal interventions or against which to 
judge the efficacy of different entitlement design choices. First, the category 
(at least as typically invoked) is underinclusive in ways that go to the heart 
of the connection between property rights and transactions. Just as there are 
costs associated with moving resources into the hands of a high valuer, 
there are costs associated with resisting transfers and keeping resources in 
the hands of a high valuer. The structural features of resource access 
arrangements—property rights—variously embody and necessitate these 
two sets of costs.  Coase’s analysis did not address transfer resistance costs, 
either because he assumed the existence of property rights capable of 
reliably resisting transfers, or because he assumed any problems with 
transfer resistance could be handled through another zero-cost transaction. 
Yet in a world of positive transaction costs, both transfer costs and transfer 
resistance costs must be taken into account, along with the misallocations 
that occur when either set of costs becomes prohibitively large.
16
   
A second problem is overinclusiveness.  Not all of the costs that are 
thrown together in the transaction cost bucket are equally amenable to legal 
interventions, nor do all of them signal inefficiencies in the allocation of 
resources.  Some transaction costs represent blunt facts about the world that 
are relatively insensitive to targeted legal interventions, like the time it takes 
a human being to read a page of text or drive to a meeting, while others are 
almost entirely the product of legal and institutional rules.   The question we 
must ask is whether there is any reason to believe that transactions are being 
underproduced by the market.  For legal scholars, the inquiry collapses into 
a related question: is there any reason to believe that transaction cost 
reductions are being underproduced?  If not, transaction costs should not 
present any special cause for concern, and the law should not attempt to 
alter, offset, or circumvent them.   
A third problem relates to another sort of heterogeneity among 
impediments to efficient resource allocation. Some obstacles, like 
communicating with another party, relate to the coordination of willing 
buyers and sellers; others, like the overstatement of one’s reservation price, 
involve conflicts over surplus.
17
 The distinction between conflict and 
                                                 
16 To be precise, the misallocations in question are of the underlying resources subject to transfer or transfer 
resistance.  There is no misallocation of resources full stop, if the costs of moving or stopping a resource exceed 
the gains from doing so, and those moving or stopping costs cannot be cost-effectively reduced.    
17 Some scholars have flagged this heterogeneity in transaction costs. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, 
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coordination applies not only when resources must be moved to reach a 
higher valuer, but also when resources must be kept from moving in order 
to remain with a higher valuer.
18
 In some cases, both nonowners and owners 
agree that a nontransfer should take place and need only coordinate over it, 
while in other cases they disagree about whether the resource should be 
transferred.  These are different sorts of problems that call for different 
solutions.  
In some ways, these are familiar points.  It is understood already that all 
ways of structuring access to resources are costly.
19
 Transaction costs can 
be (and have been) defined to include the costs of property rights
20—
although this is more of a conceptual stretch than proponents of the 
approach have acknowledged.
21
 There are large literatures that address 
various aspects of the cost minimization problem associated with 
structuring resource access, including work on the theory of the firm and 
problems of incomplete contracting.
22
 In the property field, work on the 
                                                                                                                            
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1036 
(1995)  (“[A]n overarching ‘Coasean’ theme of our analysis is that the type of transaction cost matters: It is 
inadequate to think of ‘transaction costs’ as some sort of composite good whose components imply similar 
policies.”); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2184 (1997) (distinguishing “Type 
I Transaction Costs,” which she defines as “difficulties that may result from having to find and assemble 
numerous or indistinctly defined interested parties, the costs that come prior to bargaining altogether,” from “Type 
II Transaction Costs,” which are “the impediments that come after bargaining begins, from parties who are close-
mouthed, pokerfaced, strategically bargaining misanthropes”); Richard N. Langlois, The Secret Life of Mundane 
Transaction Costs, 27 ORGANIZ. STUD. 1389 (2006) (distinguishing transaction costs associated with 
“opportunism” and “incentive misalignment” from standard neoclassical  “frictions” that are analogous to 
transportation costs).  Other scholars have moved certain conflict costs—notably the costs of strategic behavior—
outside of the transaction cost framework altogether. See infra Part I.B.1. What the analysis here adds to these 
earlier taxonomic moves is not only a matter of framing and emphasis; I also locate the conflict versus 
coordination distinction in a broader set of resource access impediments that encompasses the costs involved in 
keeping resources in place as well as the costs of transacting over them. 
18 I use the idea of “movement” here metaphorically, to mean rerouting access to the resource to a different 
user.  In the case of real property, the “thing” does not physically move.   
19 See, e.g., THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 102 (1990) (“[t]he firm, the 
market, and the legal system are all costly social arrangements”); Allen, supra note 2, at 895 (“all methods of 
allocating resources have costs and benefits, and no single mechanism works for free and dominates all others”). 
20 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2, at 898-99 (observing that commonly used understandings of transaction 
costs “implicitly recognize the threat of appropriation and theft” and stating that “[w]hen property rights are 
protected and maintained in any context, transaction costs exist”).  Yet Allen’s complaints about the “redundant” 
use of phrases like “zero transaction costs and complete property rights” (emphasis his) suggests this definition 
has not won universal acceptance.  See id.  
21 A thought experiment shows how aggressive this reading of transaction costs really is.  Suppose we were 
to reframe the Coase Theorem around an assumption of zero transfer resistance costs, rather than zero transaction 
costs, in a world without any private property rights at all. If those who value a resource most highly can 
costlessly hold onto it,  but others cannot, efficient outcomes would eventually follow if we make assumptions 
about background transfer mechanisms that are as strong as the assumptions that Coase implicitly made about 
background property rights  Had costless transfer resistance been Coase’s frame, we might now be debating 
whether the costs of markets or other means of moving resources in a more or less costly fashion were “really” 
transfer resistance costs, just as we now debate whether the institutions that provide transfer resistance (property 
rights) are “really” transaction costs.      
22 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA N.S. 386 (1937); Sanford Grossman & Oliver 
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POLIT. ECON. 691 
(1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POLIT. ECON. 1119 (1990).   
New Institutional Economics uses a broad understanding of transaction costs to examine questions of institutional 
design within firms and other organizational structures.  See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). 
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optimal scope and form of land ownership has taken to heart lessons from 
the theory of the firm in balancing internal management and external 
transactions.
23
 The relationship between the specification of property rights 
and the costs of transacting has received attention as well, with literatures 
developing around divided and incomplete property rights.
24
 Scholars have 
also recognized important differences among types of transaction costs.
25
  
Yet these insights, threaded through different economic and legal 
literatures, have not been brought together in a way that allows for their 
intuitive use in legal contexts.  Legal scholars regularly invoke the Coase 
Theorem's central term in law reviews,
26
 workshops, and classrooms, but 
they usually do so without specifying what they mean by it, much less what 
assumptions they are making about the surrounding property regime.
27
 
There is instead a tendency to fall back on simple prescriptions like "reduce 
transaction costs" or "use the law to mimic market outcomes."
28
  That 
carrying out these operations introduces costs of its own and may be less 
effective than other ways of improving resource access is rarely discussed. 
As a staple of daily discourse, the notion of transaction costs is treacherous, 
ready to mislead all those who are not prepared to steep themselves in 
oceans of economic literature on the topic, untangle deep and abiding 
mysteries about how property rights and transactions interact, and work 
through a tangle of definitional controversies.   
The reflexive resort to transaction costs thus invites confusion.  But it 
does more than that.  It also keeps legal scholars in general and property 
scholars in particular from building as usefully as they might on existing 
insights. Property theory today is alive with debate on core questions of 
entitlement design: whether property rules or liability rules should 
dominate, whether an exclusion- or thing-based vision of property should 
trump the bundle of rights metaphor, whether fixed menus of tenure forms 
aid or impede efficiency, and so on. These conversations inevitably circle 
                                                 
23 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315 (1993); Harold Demsetz, Toward a 
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAP. & PROC.) 347, 354-59 (1967). 
24 See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 17; Antonio Nicita et al. Towards a Theory of Incomplete Property 
Rights, American Law & Econ. Assoc. Ann. Meetings (2007) http://works.bepress.com/antonio_nicita/3; Amnon 
Lehavi, The Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards, 42 RUTGERS L.J. 81 (2010). 
25 See supra note 17. 
26 According to LEXIS, in the last year alone more than 1100 law review articles have included the term 
"transaction cost" (the search "transaction costs and date geq (09/02/2011)" in the U.S. & Canadian Law Review 
database produced 1101 hits).  Rerunning the search as "transaction costs w/3 defin! and date geq (09/02/2011)" 
to pick up uses that included a proximate definition (labeled as such) yielded 14 hits.   
27 There have, however, been some careful attempts to locate a fixed starting point in comparing the effects 
of  different institutional arrangements.  See Ellickson, supra note 23, at 1326, n. 34 (setting out “three 
foundational entitlements” that are treated as exogenous in comparing land institutions, building on earlier work 
by Frank Michelman).    
28 See Schlag, supra note 8, at 1662-63 (listing 5 "analytical formulae" used by law and economics scholars, 
including instructions to "approximate the outcomes" that would obtain under zero transaction cost conditions, 
and, "[w]here transaction costs are high, restructure legal entitlements so as to reduce transaction costs") (citations 
omitted).   
26-Sep-12] RESOURCE ACCESS COSTS 7 
around to transaction costs, but because the term is confusingly and 
indeterminately bound up in the very enterprise at hand—designing 
entitlements—it can offer little guidance.   
In place of a single term—transaction costs—which carries a meaning 
that is opaque, contested, and unstably related to the design of entitlements, 
we need a set of concepts that will clarify the legal scholar's task of 
improving access to resources.  As a first step in that direction, I propose 
the umbrella term of "resource access costs" to designate the full range of 
costs associated with structuring access to resources. There are three 
significant moves embedded in my construction of this category.  First, I 
include the costs of all transfers of resources, not just the costs of market 
transactions.  Second, I include the costs of resisting the transfer of 
resources. Because property rights are a powerful transfer-resistance 
technology that also influences the costs of transfers, the costs of 
formulating and enforcing entitlements becomes an explicit part of the 
analysis. Third, because the costs associated with the suboptimal use of 
resources are a function of the interaction between resource access 
structures and transfer and transfer-resistance costs, they are encompassed 
as well.   
  Creating this wide class of costs is only an interim step to addressing 
concrete resource problems. We next must identify those costs that the law 
is in a position to cost-effectively reduce. Here heterogeneity among 
resource access costs becomes important. Building on previous 
scholarship,
29
 I focus on two important subsets—conflict costs and 
coordination costs—each of which presents distinctive difficulties, 
corresponds to different features of an entitlement regime, and responds to 
different interventions.  I also make a cross-cutting distinction between 
resource access costs that are the product of unsolved collective action 
problems and those that are not.  The existence of such a collective action 
problem represents a necessary but not a sufficient condition for legal 
intervention. The question, as far as efficiency goes, is whether legal 
interventions can cost-effectively improve resource access.
 30
 If there is no 
surplus available for legal interventions to tap into, the question can be 
easily answered in the negative.  
This approach usefully refocuses the attention of property scholars. It 
has two main payoffs. First, recognizing the full range of resource access 
costs challenges conventional thinking surrounding transaction costs.  
Efforts to reduce or avoid transaction costs will often be misguided.  
Indeed, transaction costs may at times be inefficiently low, producing too 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 17. 
30 Of course, legal interventions might be appropriate for distributive or other reasons, aside from efficiency. 
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many transfers of resources to higher-valuing users.
31
 Reframing the 
relevant set of costs thus clarifies the basis for legal intervention, and the 
limits on it.   
A second set of payoffs sounds in property theory. Property rights are 
powerful mechanisms for paving the way or blocking the path between 
resources and high-valuing users. Meaningful evaluation of these 
arrangements requires moving past the property scholar’s tendency to focus 
on the primary “thing” in view when evaluating efficiency. That focus 
draws attention to impediments to the thing’s efficient allocation but away 
from the efficient allocation of resources that might be used (or not) to carry 
out transactions, stop them, or to make them less expensive. Likewise, 
property scholars concerned with transaction costs often talk past each 
other; some focus their attention on features in entitlement design that ease 
coordination, while others focus on dampening the conflict costs associated 
with private information.
32
  A clarifying vocabulary can improve the quality 
of this dialogue and recenter attention on the necessary design tradeoffs.  
For example, instead of saying a particular property feature reduces 
transaction costs, we might more usefully say that it “improves 
transactability,” “increases legibility,” or “pre-divides surplus.”    
The analysis proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I examine the relationships 
among transaction costs, property rights, and the pursuit of efficiency, with 
special attention to Demsetz’s critique of Coase’s focus on transaction 
costs.  Part II constructs the category of resource access costs, and Part III 
shows how that category can be refined and subdivided to inform legal 
interventions.  Part IV considers some objections and extensions.   
 
I.  TRANSACTION COST TROUBLE 
 
The Coase Theorem, as it is taught in law school classrooms, stands for 
the idea that parties will bargain to an efficient result regardless of the law’s 
initial assignment of entitlements if transaction costs are zero.
33
  Students 
are then reminded that, as Coase well recognized, transaction costs are not 
zero, and indeed are routinely large. Hence, the initial assignment of legal 
entitlements can and does matter to efficiency. This formulation is fairly 
uncontroversial as far as it goes, and the takeaway lesson that law matters 
                                                 
31 My argument here is very different from the argument about “too low” transaction costs put forward in 
David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost 
Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 99 (2005).  They refer to instances where transaction 
costs are prohibitive, and hence not incurred. See infra Part I.C (discussing latent and realized transaction costs).   
32 Rose makes this point when she observes that Ian Ayres and Eric Talley appear to have concerned 
themselves with “Type II” rather than “Type I” transaction costs.  Rose, supra note 17, at 2184.   
33 For example, the University of Chicago Law School included this summary of the Coase Theorem in the 
planner it distributed to law students at the beginning of last school year: “Simply stated: in a world where there 
are no transaction costs, an efficient outcome will occur regardless of the initial allocation of rights.”  THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL 2011-12 SOURCEBOOK AND PLANNER at 21.    
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after all should be reassuring to law students and their professors.  
Nonetheless, the Coase Theorem often has the side effect of turning 
transaction costs into objects of resentment.  If only they were zero!  Why 
must they be so large?  Isn’t there anything anyone can do about them, these 
destroyers of efficiency?   
This negative attention on transaction costs has led to some fruitful 
advances, but also to some wrong turns and dead ends. Understanding what 
the law should or should not try to do about transaction costs has been 
complicated by the absence of any agreed-upon definition of the term or any 
systematic way of ordering the heterogeneous phenomena that answer to 
that name.  Behind a raft of terminological debates and taxonomic shortfalls 
lies a deep and often unacknowledged confusion about how transaction 
costs relate to property rights.  Before we can start to untangle these 
difficulties, however, it is helpful to start with the intuitive case Demsetz 
raises against giving any special attention to transaction costs.   
 
A.  The Demsetzian Critique 
 
Over the past decade, Demsetz has produced a significant body of law 
and economics scholarship that, among other contributions, challenges 
certain aspects of Coase’s analysis and conclusions in The Problem of 
Social Cost.  One element of that critique goes to the relationship between 
transaction costs and economic inefficiency.
34
 While agreeing with Coase 
that a zero transaction cost world would produce allocative efficiency, 
Demsetz views it as deeply mistaken to equate positive transaction costs, or 
rational reactions to them, with inefficiency.  In a representative passage, 
Demsetz analogizes transaction costs to transportation costs: 
 
Imagine a railroad capable of shipping goods between two 
firms.  The railroad incurs costs if it does this, and the cost 
may be so high that the shipment does not occur (and, 
instead, as Coase wrote in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937), 
the would-be receiving firm chooses to rely on in-house 
production of the good that would have been shipped were 
there no transport cost).  No inefficiency has been created if 
the shipment does not take place under these circumstances, 
for the implied gain from making the shipment is less than 
the cost of doing so.  But, pray tell, we reach the same 
conclusion if we change ‘shipment cost’ to transaction cost.  
So, we had better re-examine Coase’s reasoning about 
                                                 
34 Demsetz’s critique also goes to what should be included in transaction costs, as well as to the impact on 
efficiency of property rights and ownership structure.  See infra Part I.B.      





At one level, this illustration makes the simple but powerful point that 
everything costs something, and the cost of transacting over resources is no 
different in kind from the cost of running machinery or of moving things 
from place to place.
36
 We expect rational actors to make decisions based on 
what things cost, given existing technologies and physical constraints.  It is 
a mistake to call the results inefficient if they cannot be otherwise, or cannot 
be otherwise at a cost that is less than the identified suboptimalities 
themselves. 
So far so good. But digging deeper into the example raises the question 
of why the goods that one firm needs are located a train’s journey away 
from that firm.  The legal analogue, of course, is the assignment of rights to 
parties that are not the highest valuing users of those rights.  The movement 
of rights, like the movement of goods, only comes into play when a starting 
point has separated these elements from the place where they would do the 
most good.  Because getting them to that place costs more than it is worth, 
Demsetz is right to say that, given our starting point, the results are 
efficient.  But we need not take the starting point as a given.  Demsetz 
recognizes this when he notes (citing Coase) that the goods might be 
manufactured on site rather than moved over from elsewhere.
37
  
Not only can private parties use a change in ownership structure to alter 
the starting point, but the law itself can decide how entitlements will be 
allocated in the first instance. Demsetz recognizes this as well.  Indeed, he 
has located the inefficiency in Coase’s account in the law’s misallocation of 
legal entitlements, not in positive transaction costs.
38
 For legal scholars, 
Demsetz’s insistence that the law, not the market, is to blame for 
inefficiencies will sound neither novel nor surprising. We are already 
occupationally inclined to think law is the most likely culprit, or at least the 
                                                 
35 Demsetz, What Problem? supra note 8, at 7.   
36 Elsewhere Demsetz describes transactions as a product like any other:  
 
Transaction cost is no different from other costs in regard to determining which good 
or service is to be produced.  If the cost of producing a hydrogen-fueled automobile exceeds 
the price that people are willing to pay for the vehicle, efficient resource allocation requires 
that this vehicle not be produced. Similarly, efficient resource allocation requires that a 
transaction not take place if the cost of producing the transaction exceeds the price that 
people are willing to pay to engage in exchange.  We do not shout ‘inefficiency!’ if the 
vehicle is not produced.  Why proclaim inefficiency if a transaction is not produced?” 
 
DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 109-10.   
37 Demsetz, supra note 8, at 7.   
38 E.g., DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 111-12.  Demsetz focuses on a Coase's statement that when transaction 
costs are higher than the gains from transacting, “the initial delimitation of legal rights does have an effect on the 
efficiency with which the economic system operates.”  Id. (quoting Coase, supra note 1, at 16).  As Demsetz 
convincingly argues, the economic system does not operate with any less efficiency owing to positive transaction 
costs; instead, it “does the best that can possibly be done” under the circumstances.  Id. at 112.   
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most tractable margin for seeking improvement.  Instead, legal scholars’ 
interest in transaction costs is very much like our interest in transportation 
costs might be if the government were to propose allocating location-
specific goods by random helicopter drop. Positive transportation costs 
would make this a poor way of getting goods physically into the hands of 
those who value them most highly. But if transportation costs were zero (the 
goods could frictionlessly glide to the places they are most valued), we 
would not fret about the distribution mechanism.  
On this account, transaction costs help to identify instances in which the 
law’s allocation mechanism is likely to be worth the cost of worrying about.  
Transaction costs are thus different in kind from other sorts of costs, like 
burning cleaner coal or moving goods around from place to place.
39
 And 
they are different in kind for a reason Demsetz himself emphasizes:  they 
are occasioned by an act occurring outside of the market system in the 
court’s assignment of entitlements.40 Legal scholars may, therefore, have 
good reason to pay special attention to transaction costs, even if economists 
have no reason to treat them differently from any other cost.  Not only 
might high transaction costs suggest that courts and other legal institutions 
should take more care in assigning entitlements efficiently in the first place, 
legal scholars might work on finding other ways to lower, counter, or 
sidestep transaction costs.   
Yet each of these measures should be undertaken only if it is worth it, 
which requires a comparison of all the other possible ways of dealing with 
the misallocation, from letting it be, to resolving it with a more accurate 
initial assignment, to altering the underlying entitlement design, to applying 
some other transaction cost reduction or avoidance technique. Guido 
Calabresi made just this point in observing that the costs of both 
transactions and transaction substitutes must be considered in deciding what 
to do about misallocations.
41
   
Demsetz’s transportation example contains no such comparisons 
because it involves costs that are assumed to be immutable, at least in the 
short run.
42
  If we could invent a faster train, transportation costs that were 
                                                 
39 These are two of the examples that Demsetz uses in arguing that transaction costs are no different from 
other costs.  See Demsetz, supra note 8, at 7, 10. 
40 See, e.g., id. at 8-9. 
41 See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment, 11 J. L. & 
ECON. 67, 69 (1968) (observing that “transactions do cost money,” and that “substitutes for transactions, be they 
taxation, liability rules, or structural rules, are also not costless").  Calabresi goes on to explain:  “Whatever device 
is used, the question must be asked: Are its costs worth the benefits in better resource allocations it brings about or 
have we instead approached a false optimum by a series of games that are not worth the candles used?”  Id. This 
general approach is consistent with Calabresi’s later work on the costs of accidents, which also powerfully applies 
the insight that problems are only worth solving if the solution is cheaper than the problem itself.  See generally 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). 
42 Demsetz does, however, consider (without endorsing) the possibility that the court system could be run on 
market principles.  If the court were dependent “on revenues secured from petitioners who purchase their services 
and decisions,”  he argues, “ownership of a disputed resource would never go to the petitioner who is less capable 
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initially prohibitive could fall low enough to be worth incurring.  This 
possibility alone does not make out a case for legal intervention, however.  
We cannot assume that the absence of a faster train is a product of 
inefficiency without knowing why the faster train is not running. Does it 
cost more to invent, produce, and maintain than it is worth?  Have political 
factions conspired to keep it out of production, or does the law fail to grant 
sufficient returns to the inventor?
43
   
Ultimately, the standard Chicago assertion that there is no cost-effective 
faster train (because if there were, we would all be riding on it already) 
depends on assumptions about the processes (markets and politics) that 
produce trains. Likewise, if the magnitude of transaction costs depends not 
on the interplay of competitive markets but rather on governmental 
responses (or the lack thereof) to collective action problems, the Chicago 
retort holds considerably less sway. But is that the case? The answer 
depends on just what we mean by transaction costs.   
     
B.  Contested Definitional Terrain 
 
The definition of transaction costs has been a source of disagreement 
and confusion among scholars.
44
 In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase 
himself did not use the term “transaction cost”45 but instead referred to the 
“costs involved in carrying out a market transaction,” which he described as 
follows:   
 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to 
discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform 
people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct 
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, 
to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the 




Later, Coase embraced Carl Dahlman’s breakdown of transaction costs into 
“search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and 
enforcement costs.”47  Scholars have subsequently developed a variety of 
                                                                                                                            
of maximizing value from its use.”  Demsetz, supra note 8, at 9.   
43 Even if this is so, it is still not clear we can claim inefficiency.  We would need to know how the costs of 
altering the legal or political landscape in ways that would be more conducive to the production of the fast trains 
compare with the gains those trains will deliver.   
44 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 16 (1982) (“The meaning of transaction 
cost is not well-standardized in the literature.”). 
45 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611,  612 n.8 
(1989) (pointing this out).   
46 Coase, supra note 1, at 15. 
47 R.H. COASE,  THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 6 (1988) (quoting Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of 
Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979)); see also  Ellickson, supra note 45, at 614 (characterizing this 
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other transaction cost taxonomies.
48
   
 There is broad agreement that the costs people incur to get together, 
communicate with each other, and draw up and police contracts represent 
transaction costs.  But the status of some other elements is contested.  
Indeed, Douglas Allen has observed a sharp dichotomy in the use of the 
term, with the “neoclassical” literature taking a much narrower view of 
transaction costs than the “property rights” literature.49  On the narrowest 
account, the one to which Demsetz subscribes, transaction costs are limited 
to the cost of using the price system under conditions of perfect 
competition
50—a state of the world that leaves no room for haggling and 
that presupposes the existence of property rights.  Other accounts, including 
those used by most scholars concerned with property rights, are 
considerably broader.     
Three sets of costs relevant to the law’s treatment of entitlements have 
been inconsistently welcomed in, booted out, or ignored altogether in 
various definitions of transaction costs:   strategic bargaining behavior, the 
costs of defining and enforcing property rights, and the costs of internal 
governance within property holdings or firms. 
 
1. Strategic Bargaining Behavior.   
 
Some of the most significant and troublesome barriers to exchange 
involve strategic behavior. Two familiar subspecies of strategic behavior are 
“free riding,” which involves misrepresenting the price one is willing to 
pay, and “holding out,” which involves misrepresenting the price one is 
willing to accept.
51
 In addition to these problems, which are usually 
associated with multi-player scenarios,
52
 are problems of bilateral monopoly 
                                                                                                                            
taxonomy as dividing up transaction costs temporally, based on whether they are “incurred at a pre-bargain, 
bargain, or post-bargain stage”). 
48 See, e.g, Ellickson, supra note 45, at 615-16 (breaking up transaction costs along functional lines into 
“get-together costs,” “decision and execution costs,” and “information costs”); Rose, supra note 17, at 2184 
(defining and distinguishing “Type I” and “Type II” transaction costs); Langlois, supra 17, at 1392, fig. 1 
(breaking down transaction costs in several ways, including whether the costs are “fixed,” “a function of time,” or 
“a function of number of exchanges or volume of  trade”). 
49 See Allen, supra note 14.  The neoclassical view is exemplified by Demsetz, who treats transaction costs 
as nothing more or less than the cost of using the market.  Id. at 903-04.  See also Schlag, supra note 8, at 1674-76 
(discussing definitional disputes).   
50 See DEMSETZ, supra note 11, at 107.  
51 Sometimes individuals who accurately represent their idiosyncratically high reservation prices are 
popularly dubbed “holdouts,” but I prefer Seigelman & Parchomovsky’s alternative term, “holdin” for these 
individuals. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law 
and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 128-29 (2004). An extreme version of (true) holding out involves 
misrepresenting not only the magnitude of one’s reservation price but also its sign—as where a terrible musician 
whose sounds hurt even his own ears will play in order to be paid to stop. See, e.g., Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic 
Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L REV. 1641 (2011); see also Harold Demsetz, Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution 
Control: Comments on Comments, 9 WESTERN ECON. J. 444 (1971);  Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of 
Liability Matter?  1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 22-25 (1972). 
52 Free-riding arises in contexts where more than one person is in a position to fund a good from which other 
individuals cannot be cost-effectively excluded.  Holding out is often, although not always, associated with 
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in which struggles over the division of surplus can take the form of a 
Chicken Game.
53
  These strategic impediments to bargaining are included in 
some definitions of the term “transaction costs,” but not others.54 Coase’s 
own phrase, “to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain,” could be 
read to encompass strategic interactions.  Indeed, it might seem implausible 
that Coase would mention the costs of “negotiation”—an activity that, by 
definition, only occurs when there is surplus on the table that must be 
divided up
55—unless he meant to include the costs associated with parties 
attempting to garner larger shares of that surplus for themselves.
56
  
However, Coase later expressed doubt that conflicts over surplus division 
would thwart bargains in a significant proportion of cases,
57
 which might 
support a narrower reading.
58
       
Demsetz, for his part, contends that strategic behavior—manifested as 
misrepresentation of reservation prices—cannot count as a transaction 
cost.
59
 Similarly, Robert Cooter asserts that parties to bargaining 
interactions face “another obstacle of an entirely different kind” from 
transaction costs when they must decide how to divide up the surplus in the 
absence of a fixed price.”60 Other scholars, however, have placed some or 
all strategic bargaining costs under the heading of transaction costs. Oliver 
                                                                                                                            
settings where a number of parties hold entitlements that must be assembled, and each one is essential to the 
project as a whole.  Because large number holdout situations can be broken down into a series of two-player 
bilateral monopoly situations between a would-be assembler and each would-be seller, the same Chicken Game 
analysis that applies to the latter also applies to the former.  See, e.g., CHARLES J. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS:  
CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (1984)  (describing a land use assembly problem as “chicken in action”); Lee Anne 
Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 907, 941-42, 946-47 (2004) (applying the Chicken Game 
template to anticommons problems).  For an illuminating discussion of the differences and similarities between 
holding out and free riding, see Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1991). 
53 The Chicken Game has thus been used to illuminate a variety of bargaining situations.  See, e,g., 
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 43-45 (1994); WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL 
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 130-32 (2007). 
54 See e.g., Schlag, supra note 8, at 1675-76.   
55 Negotiation has no place in competitive markets; market participants instead confront “non-negotiable 
equilibrium market prices, prices that cannot be influenced by individual bargaining.”  Demsetz, supra note 8, at 
12. If there is any negotiation going on, then, it must be under conditions where there is no competitive price and a 
real question of how to divide gains from trade.  See Cooter, supra note 44, at 17.   
56 But see Demsetz, supra note 8, at 12  (“Close reading of Pigou and Coase does not reveal concerns about 
strategic misrepresentation.”); Cooter, supra note 44, at 19 (suggesting Coase viewed "strategic considerations" as 
"inconsequential"). 
57 See COASE, supra note 47, at 161 (discussing the problem of surplus division and stating that "there is 
good reason to suppose that the proportion of cases in which no agreement is reached will be small").    
58 Coase might still regard the costs that strategic behavior  imposes on the bargaining process as transaction 
costs, even if such strategies would not often preclude a bargain altogether, although those costs are themselves 
parasitic on the credible threat of "no deal."  See also Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 
J. L. & ECON. 427, 429-30 (1972) (arguing that to include “bargaining tactics” among transaction costs would call 
into question the compatibility of individual rationality and zero transaction costs—at least if one supposes that 
rational actors may sometimes bargain in ways that fail to reach efficient outcomes). 
59 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 8, at 11 (“The potential for deceit is not due to positive transaction cost.  If 
everyone who would benefit from improved climate could transact freely (that is, could be gathered at no cost, 
could speak to each other at no cost, could write and enforce contracts at no cost), the problem of biased demand 
revelation would still remain.”).    
60 Cooter, supra note 44, at 17.    
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Williamson would count strategic behavior among transaction costs.
61
 
Guido Calabresi includes among transaction costs the “costs of excluding 
from the benefits the free loaders, that is, those who would gain from a 
bargain but are unwilling to pay to bring it about.”62 The costs associated 
with holding out have also been expressly encompassed in some accounts of 
transaction costs.
63
 Other scholarship sends mixed signals about whether 
strategic behavior is or is not a transaction cost.
64
 
 This definitional issue has attracted interest because removing strategic 
behavior from the realm of transaction costs presents a challenge to the 
Coase Theorem.
65
 Eliminating transaction costs (defined to exclude such 
behavior) would not be enough to ensure an efficient result outside of 
competitive market conditions.  Or, as Cooter bluntly puts it:  “The Coase 
Theorem is false because the final obstacle to private noncompetitive 
bargains is the absence of a rule for dividing the surplus, not the cost of 
bargaining.”66  Yet, the lack of a rule about surplus is not an immutable 
fact; it stems from a failure to specify rights over that surplus ex ante.
67
  If 
that lack of specification is itself a product of high transaction costs (of 
obtaining information, of contracting over all contingencies),
68
 then 
Cooter's critique begins to unravel—but so too does our grip on the 
preconditions for transactions.   
 
                                                 
61 WILLIAMSON, supra note 22, at 251-52 (observing, in discussing Coase’s work: “Instead of costless 
bargaining, my negotiations are characterized by information impactedness, opportunism, and the sacrifice of 
valuable resources as parties seek strategic advantage and thereafter engage in haggling”). 
62 Calabresi, supra note 41, at 67.  Interestingly, Cooter seems willing to count the costs of excluding 
“freeloaders” as a transaction cost, despite his insistence that strategic behavior in the absence of fixed prices 
represents a wholly distinct phenomena.  See Cooter, supra note 44, at 16 (citing Calabresi, supra note 41).  
Demsetz, in contrast, views free riding as a serious impediment to efficiency but does not consider it a transaction 
cost.  DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 116-17 (classifying free-rider problems as “ownership costs” rather than 
“transaction costs”).    
63 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 103 (1998); 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:  Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power 
Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 273 (1986).   
64 For example, Robert Ellickson includes “information costs” in his taxonomy of transaction costs, and then 
indicates in a footnote that “[s]trategic behavior by a bargainer is designed to generate information about a 
transferor's reservation price and terms.”  Ellickson, supra note 45, at 615-16 & n. 25. Earlier in the same article, 
however, Ellickson makes an offhand reference to “armchair theorizing about whether strategic behavior, or 
wealth effects, or nonconvexities, or what-not might undermine Coase-Theorem predictions about life in the 
never-never-world of zero transaction costs”—an aside that suggests “strategic behavior” could exist even if 
transaction costs were zero.  Id. at 613.   
65 See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 8, at 1675-76.  
66 Cooter, supra note 44, at 28.  Cooter does posit that a version of the Coase Theorem that specifies not only 
zero transaction costs but also “perfect competition” and “perfect information” holds true.  Cooter, supra note 44, 
at 15 (citing Richard O. Zerbe, The Problem of Social Cost: Fifteen Years Later, in THEORY AND MEASUREMENT 
OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 29 (Steven A.Y. Lin, ed. 1976)).     
67 This failure to specify surplus division is a general characteristic of private property rights, although it can 
be characterized as a way in which private property rights are incomplete.  See Lee Anne Fennell, Property and 
Precaution 4(2) J. TORT L. 1, 60 n.246 (2011); text accompanying note 135, supra. 
68 See STEVEN N.S. CHEUNG, WILL CHINA GO ‘CAPITALIST’? AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 37 (2d  ed. 1986) (“If all transactions, broadly defined, were truly zero, it 
would have to be accepted that consumer preferences would be revealed without cost.”) (emphasis in original).  
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2. Defining and Enforcing Property Rights.   
 
Coase’s framework assumes the existence of property rights.69 
Demsetz’s work emphasizes that property entitlements cost something to 
define and enforce.
70
  Should these costs count as transaction costs? At one 
level, the construction of enforceable entitlements seems fully anterior to 
the transactions with which Coase was concerned.  Transactions have 
entitlements as their subjects, and property law merely provides the vehicles 
in which tradable commodities arrive on the scene. There may be problems 
designing those vehicles—as where indivisibilities enable free rider 
problems—but for Demsetz, at least, those problems are not transaction 
costs.
71
    
However, transaction costs have been understood to include the costs of 
enforcing agreements.  Not only does Coase’s initial definition hint in this 
direction by including costs “to undertake the inspection needed to make 
sure that the terms of the contract are being observed,” he later expressly 
endorses Dahlman’s placement of “policing and enforcement costs” under 
the transaction cost umbrella.
72
 Property rights might be viewed either as a 
means for policing agreements, or as a technology that lowers the cost of 
doing so.
73
  At a more fundamental level, the work of defining and 
enforcing property entitlements is one of many costs that society incurs to 
create conditions conducive to enforceable transactions.  Oran Young puts it 
this way:  
 
[M]ajor transaction costs will not show up in prices or be 
taken into account in ordinary efficiency calculations.  These 
include such things as the costs of defining and securing 
property rights, enforcing contracts, and maintaining 




Of course, many other things are but-for preconditions of transactions, 
including the development of language, mathematics, and a monetary 
system. Calling them all transaction costs seems overbroad.  Property rights 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Coase, supra note 1, at 8; Demsetz, supra note 12, at S655.  Coase's conception of property 
rights has been criticized for being insufficiently "Coasean."  See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, 
Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J. L. & ECON. S77 (2011).  Merrill & Smith’s critique focuses on 
Coase’s assumption that property entitlements can be disaggregated and combined without limit.  Because a 
Coasean conception of interactions among entitlement-holders is sensitive to transaction costs, it suggests the 
need to create property packages that will minimize these costs.  See id.  at S92-99. 
70 See generally Demsetz, supra note 23.   
71 See Demsetz, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
72 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
73 See Allen, supra note 2, at 899 (noting connections between the transaction costs of “inspection, 
enforcing, policing, and measurement” and property rights).   
74 ORAN R. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES: NATURAL AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 129 (1982) (citing E.J. 
Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay, 9 J. Econ. Lit. 1, 21-24 (1971) 
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arguably stand in a different relationship to transactions than these fixed 
(and long sunk) costs because they are legally malleable features of the 
world that produce ongoing costs themselves and influence the costliness of 
transactions going forward.
75
   
Yet reading transaction costs to subsume the whole of property rights is 
problematic. For one thing, almost everyone speaks and writes as if 
transaction costs and property rights are separate things – right down to the 
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, which  awarded Ronald Coase the 
1991 Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel "for his 
discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and 
property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the 
economy."
76
  Linguistic habits aside, viewing property as just another flavor 
of transaction costs is conceptually incoherent, if we think that there must 
be some object of a transaction—a point to which I will return.   
Nonetheless, the inclination to include property rights in the analysis 
surrounding transaction costs is understandable. Property rights can make 
transactions easier in some ways and harder in other ways.  Their scope and 
complementarity will determine the need for further transactions.
77
  
Moreover, property's primary strategy—identifying an "owner" as the 
residual claimant—avoids the high costs of transacting over every 
contingency.
78
 This point connects to bodies of work on incomplete 
contracting and  the theory of the firm,
79
 and it brings us to another area of 
contested definitional terrain.   
  
3. Internal Governance.   
 
Another set of costs relates to property organization, and specifically to 
the governance burdens found on the inside of the property envelope.  For 
example, firms may integrate a variety of functions as a result of high 
(inter-firm) transaction costs.
80
  Fred McChesney has taken the view that 
these internal “management costs” might be termed a form of transaction 
costs, while Demsetz has assumed the opposite.
81
  Coase himself discussed 
organizational changes such as vertical or horizontal integration as 
                                                 
75 See Langlois, supra note 17, at 1392-93 & fig. 1 (identifying both fixed transaction costs and transaction 
costs that are a function of time as “costs of property rights”).   
76Nobelprize.org, www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/press.html (emphasis added).   
77 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 69. 
78 See, e.g., Grossman & Hart, supra note 22, at 692, 695. 
79 See supra note 22. 
80 See, e.g., COASE supra note 22.   
81 See DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 107 (“Coase clearly meant to distinguish costs incurred to manage 
resources within the firm from costs incurred to interact across markets at market-determined prices, and I wish to 
preserve this distinction.”); McChesney, supra note 13, at 190-91 (observing that "what Demsetz refers to as 
'management costs' are just internal transaction costs" and noting that the these costs would be encompassed if 
transaction costs were "defined as all costs arising from interactions among two or more economic actors").   
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alternatives to high costs of market transactions.
82
 But this would not rule 
out applying the more generic moniker of transaction costs to both classes 
of costs, and their much-remarked ability to substitute for each other might 
argue for bringing them within the same analytic umbrella.
83
 
Adding this last category to the definition of transaction costs makes the 
term broad enough to reach the institutional structures in which transactions 
(or their substitutes) take place, as well as the transactions themselves.  
Indeed, Steven Cheung has suggested that “[w]ere it not for the popular 
usage of the [transaction cost] term, they should perhaps be called 
‘institution costs.’”84 Douglas Allen's expansive definition similarly 
embraces the costs associated with establishing and operating property 
institutions.
85
 Such a broad definition of transaction costs avoids certain 
problems of underinclusiveness, but it does not help to structure the analytic 
work of designing entitlements or determining when legal interventions are 
called for.  The problems of overinclusiveness and lack of specification 
remain. 
 
C.  Realized and Latent Transaction Costs 
 
All of the definitional debates outlined above stem from a single cause: 
the uneasy relationship between property rights and transaction costs.  The 
nature of the problem becomes evident if we consider what the expression 
“zero transaction costs” means.  If the phrase means just that there are no 
observable transactions occurring on the ground that generate any costs, 
then we would be in a zero transaction cost world anytime bargaining was 
shut down by some external factor like a governmental prohibition on 
trades, as well as anytime parties became too discouraged by the prospects 
of transacting to even give it a try.  This is not the zero transaction cost 
world Coase meant to reference.
86
 Zero transaction costs must, therefore, 
mean not just a literal absence of costs associated with transacting, but 
rather an ability to costlessly complete transactions.   
By the same token, positive transaction costs exist not only when we 
actually observe them being incurred (“realized transaction costs”) but also 
when incurring such costs would be necessary to complete a given 
                                                 
82 Coase, supra note 1, at 16. 
83 See, e.g., Thráinn Eggertsson, Analyzing Institutional Successes and Failures: A Millennium of Common 
Mountain Pastures in Iceland, 12 INTERNAT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 423, 425 (1992) (treating “costs of exclusion 
and internal governance” as transaction costs).   
84 CHEUNG, supra note 68, at 34.    
85 See Allen, supra note 5.   
86 Id. (explaining that “transaction costs” may, on a broad definition, “occur in the total absence of market 
transactions or even where property rights are not transferable.”). But cf. Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 31 at 99 
(pairing an assertion that transaction costs can be “too low” with an example in which prohibitively high expected 
transaction costs discourage the parties from undertaking expenditures on transactions).   
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transaction through the market (“latent transaction costs”87)—even if the 
entitlement in question is never transferred or is transferred using some 
nonmarket means.  Positive transaction costs are a condition that, much like 
gravity, exists in the background even when arrangements exist to counter 
or eliminate its immediate effects. A zero-gravity chamber can be created 
on Earth, but every detail of its construction and operation is a product of 
the force it is fighting to overcome. Likewise, the costs of transactions are a 
latent and shaping presence even in contexts where observable transaction 
costs, and even transactions themselves, are absent.
88
  
A central way in which latent transaction costs manifest themselves in 
abstentia is through the formulation of property rights, which avoid the need 
for certain kinds of transactions and lower the costs of others, but also carry 
costs of  their own. The implications of this point are interesting for 
property scholars.  Suppose a particular configuration of property rights, 
such as liability rule protection that allows for unilateral transfers of 
entitlements, makes transactions unnecessary. This in no way implies we 
have reached a zero transaction cost world; rather, it is quite consistent with 
a world in which (latent) transaction costs are high, even though the liability 
rule regime keeps anyone from having to experience them.  The same might 
be said about ownership structures that encompass a variety of disparate 
enterprises in order to control transaction costs. Indeed, property rule 
protected entitlements in general, which substitute a simple in rem regime 
for private deals with every would-be encroacher, have been cast as 
mechanisms for economizing on transaction costs.
89
   
 At this point, the reader will detect a troubling unraveling effect.  Coase 
assumed the existence of property rights, but if property rights are really 
just a manifestation of latent transaction costs, why would they (how could 
they) even exist in a zero transaction cost world?
90
 On the other hand, it is 
hard to conceptualize what a “transaction” would mean in a world without 
any property rights—what would there be to transact over?91 Indeed, 
                                                 
87 The term “latent transaction costs” has been used by scholars previously in a variety of ways.  David 
Driesen & Shubha Ghosh use the term "phantom transaction costs" in a similar manner.  See Driesen & Ghosh, 
supra note 31 at 82-84. 
88 CHEUNG, supra note 68, at 34.  I am not advancing a principle of conservation here.   Transaction costs 
(and those costs they occasion) can clearly drop in absolute terms, whether through technological or legal 
innovation.   
89 Chang & Smith, supra note 3, at 22 (arguing that “property is a law of things ... for transaction cost 
reasons”). 
90 One answer is simply that property rights would be unnecessary in a zero transaction cost world. See id. at 
23, n.58; see also CHEUNG,  supra note 68, at 37 “[W]e discover that the assumption of private property rights 
can be dropped without in the least negating the Coase Theorem!  That is . . . in the absence of transaction costs 
the allocation of resources would be the same regardless of the nature of property rights or regardless of the 
operative economic institution”) (emphasis in original);  COASE, supra note 47, at 14-15 (“Cheung has even 
argued that, if transaction costs are zero, ‘the assumption of private property rights can be dropped without in the 
least negating the Coase Theorem,’ and he is no doubt right.”). 
91 See Allen, supra note 2, at 898.  Scholars who maintain that “property” refers to a set of entitlements with 
certain core institutional features might answer that if transaction costs were zero, individuals could transact over 
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imagining the conditions under which no latent transaction costs would be 
present requires stripping away not only property rights, but also all forms 
of government, transportation, communication, education, monetary 
systems, firms, households, and so on.  The notion of a zero transaction cost 
world quickly becomes a metaphysical sinkhole, lending credence to 
Coase’s suggestion that “[i]t would not seem worthwhile to spend much 
time investigating the properties of such a world.”92 So let us step back 
from the abyss and make some observations.  
Positive transaction costs might be understood to produce three effects 
in the real world: 1) the realized costs associated with actual transactions 
that we can observe on the ground;  2) prohibitive, unincurred transaction 
costs that manifest themselves latently in thing-misallocation, and 3) 
unincurred transaction costs that manifest themselves latently in other costly 
resource access structures, such as property entitlements, legal institutions, 
firms, norms, and various forms of self-help.  When transaction costs are of 
the latent variety, we observe not the cost of the (untaken) transaction but 
some other costly result that, as a first cut, we might assume to be cheaper 
than that untaken transaction would have been: Demsetz’s efficiently 
unshipped shipment. Perhaps the costs of completing the transaction could 
be cost-effectively reduced by incurring further costs of the #3 variety, but 
perhaps the reverse is true and we should have fewer #3 costs and more #1 
and #2 costs. Any observed combination of the three effects may be 
efficient; the question is whether there is any way to reduce any of these 
costs without increasing the others by an offsetting or larger amount. 
The three effects above can unwind the “chicken and egg” nature of 
transaction costs and property rights. Imagine that the world starts in a state 
of nature dominated by effect #2, where resources are widely misallocated 
because transactions are prohibitively expensive. It will be impossible to 
move from this world to a world of realized transaction costs without first 
laying some sort of institutional groundwork to enable transactions.  That is, 
only after we see a certain amount of effect #3 (including the formation of 
property rights) does it become possible for effect #1 (the costs of actual, 
realized transactions) to be observed. Thus, transaction cost expenditures of 
the latent variety can logically precede property rights even if transactions 
themselves realistically cannot.  Yet because transaction costs also persist 
even after private property rights and other ways of structuring access to 
resources are in place, it is easy to identify them with the costs of market 
                                                                                                                            
bare use privileges and their own labor inputs on a moment-by-moment basis—all without ever using the 
institution of “property” as such.  See Lee & Smith, supra note 3, at 147-48 (discussing the possibility that "ultra-
thin" entitlements might be traded, but for prohibitive transaction costs). Although this approach would allow for 
transactions without property (simply by narrowly defining the term property) it would not wholly succeed in 
stopping the unraveling effect noted in the text.  Even the barest entitlement, and even the idea of an entitlement, 
is a mechanism for delivering a stream of benefits in a sensible way where transaction costs are not zero.    
92 COASE, supra note 47, at 15. 
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transactions (effect #1) and lament their contribution to thing-misallocation 
(effect #2) without revisiting their latent role in the institutions and practices 
surrounding resource access (effect #3).   
The awkwardness of thinking in terms of latent transaction costs 
suggests that the transaction cost category suffers from boundary problems 
that run deeper than a list of terminological quibbles. There is a reason why 
transaction costs are so hard to define: the movement of entitlements is 
entwined with a set of costs relating to property ownership, yet ownership 
sits uneasily in the transaction cost framework, either relegated to the 
sidelines, partly in and partly out of the game, or swallowed up by it in 
ways that make its relevance unclear. There is a better way of thinking 
about the relationships among property entitlements, transaction costs, and 
the efficient allocation of resources.     
 
II.  RESOURCE ACCESS COSTS 
 
Let us start over from a somewhat different place by reframing the 
problem to which legal innovations and interventions must respond.  People 
derive value from the use of resources. The total amount of value gleaned 
from the enjoyment and deployment of resources depends on the specific 
ways (how and when and by whom and in what combinations) those 
resources are accessed.   Thus, the law must find ways to structure access to 
resources. Property rights represent a way of structuring access by 
designating an owner who has a specified set of rights and enjoys a residual 
claim on the asset. Markets, backed by legal rules that permit alienability, 
are also a way of structuring access, one that generally presupposes the 
existence of property rights (or other de jure or de facto entitlements to use 
a resource). Politics also form part of the overall resource access 
arrangement; the law specifies the circumstances in which votes can 
override the resource access decisions of both owners and markets. 
Likewise, courts and agencies may reassign entitlements or otherwise 
reroute access.
93
   
All resource access arrangements have costs.  That is, resources must be 
used and deployed to structure access to other resources. Our problem is not 
a lack of transactions, but rather a larger set of impediments to optimal 
patterns of resource access, in a world where resources must be consumed 
to create and maintain those patterns.   We can start our analysis by seeing 
how and why high-valuing users might get separated from resources.         
 
                                                 
93 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:  One View 
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1972) (observing that the state must decide both who shall 
hold an entitlement and how that entitlement will be protected).   
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 can be separated from things in two basic ways: 
through transfers that occur, and through transfers that do not occur.
 95
  Of 
course, these are the same two ways that high-valuing users get (or keep) 
access to resources.  Table 1 lays out the possibilities.    
 
Table 1:  Transfers and Nontransfers 
 
               
Current Possessor 
  




High Valuer A [Good Keep] C [Bad Shift] 
Low Valuer B  [Bad Keep] D [Good Shift] 
 
In the first column, we have two situations in which a transfer does not 
occur.  In Cell A, this is good thing;
96
 the high valuer keeps the resource.  In 
Cell B, we have the unhappy result in which the high valuer does not gain 
access to the resource. This may be due to strategic or emotional behavior 
in the bargaining process on the part of one or both parties (blocking by the 
owner or walking away by the would-be purchaser). Or it could instead be 
the result of parties' failure to locate each other and work through the 
necessary coordinating steps to complete the transfer. Third parties, 
including governmental actors, might also block worthwhile transfers, 
where they control a needed input (such as liquidity or a necessary permit).  
These blockades, too, could either be strategic or the product of failed 
coordination, or they might (as in the case of some governmental 
impediments) stem from other normative commitments.
97
   
                                                 
94 A high-valuing user might be understood as one who possesses human inputs that are complementary to 
the resource in question, and, when combined with them, will maximize the value that can be derived from that 
resource.  This could be through simple consumption or through the act of combining multiple resources to which 
one has access; I am the high valuer of the berry if my input of eating the berry or mixing it into a pie will cause it 
to produce greater value than it would in some alternative use. As discussed in Part IV.C.2, infra, it is the fact that 
these human inputs are nontransferable that makes resource access the crucial variable for legal analysis. 
Significantly, the institutional structures that provide access to resources also must be designed to elicit the human 
inputs that will make that access valuable.  If the value of the human input is by its own nature fully internalized, 
as it is quite literally through berry consumption, no issue arises, but if value is created for consumption by others 
(as through making berry pies for resale) property and contract principles may become necessary to induce the 
relevant human inputs.   
95 Under some property regimes, these problems become interwoven. For example, where resources are held 
in common, other commoners can block resources from being used by others, or may misappropriate resources 
that would be more valuable if left in place. A similar story can be told where resources are held not in common 
but in agency relationships: the agent may misappropriate resources of the principal or block the optimal use of 
the agent’s own human capital, via shirking.   
96 The terms "good" and "bad" in Table 1 are accurate only insofar as all other costs are held constant.  As 
emphasized below, the normative desirability of these shifts and keeps depends not only on whether they give the 
high valuer access to the resource in question, but also on how much it costs to achieve this result. 
97 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 93, at 1111-15 (discussing inalienability rules and their 
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The second column contains completed transfers. Cell C represents 
transfers that go to a lower valuer, a bad thing.  Such transfers may  involve 
the misappropriation of a resource by a lower valuer or the foisting of an 
asset upon a lower valuer through a value-reducing exchange. Alternatively, 
a Cell C transfer may happen inadvertently, as when a resource is 
transferred to a lower valuer as a result of mistake on the part of one or both 
parties—a kind of fumble.98  Cell D reflects shifts to higher valuers.  
Governmental transfers can fall into either Cell C or D. 
It would be tempting, but wrong, to automatically associate Cells A and 
D with efficiency, and Cells B and C with inefficiency.  Whether the 
transfers or nontransfers reflected in these cells are efficient or inefficient 
depends not only on whether they get or keep the resource in the hands of a 
high valuer, but also on the resources expended to produce that result.  To 
put it another way, the resource under discussion in the chart (whether a 
chunk of land, a chattel, or a particular use right) is never the only resource 
in the story. We must also think about the other resources that must be 
expended to complete or stop each transfer. Thus, we should think of Cells 
A and D as containing goods that we must pay for in some manner.  
Likewise, Cells B and C contain bads that we must pay to avoid.  Framing 
things in this way makes it clear that we as a society can make the mistake 
of purchasing too many Cell A retentions and too many Cell D transfers, 
and that we can also pay too much to avoid Cell B and C outcomes. The 
costs involved may be institutional or transactional in nature or may take 
the form of self-help or wrangling of various sorts, as the next section 
explains.   
 
B.  Guarding, Invading, and Fighting  
 
The two basic ways that high valuers get separated from their 
resources—transfers and nontransfers—are not the end of the story.  Parties 
can engage in a wide variety of defensive and reactive moves in an effort to 
stop transfers, or to carry them out.  For example, an owner can protect her 
property by building fences, adding locks, or procuring watchdogs. A 
would-be invader can invest in ladders, lockpicks, and meaty bribes, 
spurring counter-investments in higher fences, better locks, bribe-proof 
dogs, and so on.  Similarly, a commoner might respond to another 
commoner’s conflicting claim on a resource with violence or harsh looks, or 
might attempt to forestall such conflicting claims by, say, camping out by 
the berry patch with an automatic weapon at hand.    
                                                                                                                            
rationales).   
98 Market-based foisting and fumbling may be fortuitously dampened by high transaction costs.  See Driesen 
& Ghosh, supra note 31, at 87.   
24 Fennell [26-Sep-12 
Defensive and reactive dissipation of value may produce suboptimal use 
of the primary resource under consideration, if the resource is destroyed or 
damaged in the fray or sits fallow during the dispute. But it also involves 
the suboptimal use of other resources—time and expenditures devoted to 
guarding, fighting, invading, and so on.  Costly defenses and reactions may 
be undertaken not only by high-valuers of the target resource but also by 
low-valuers who wish either to fend off thieves or to overcome the fending-
off in order to act as thieves themselves.  These sources of dissipation 
explain why theft is not governed by a liability rule that would enable a 
higher valuer to simply take and pay.
99
 The thief may be the higher valuer 
of the thing in question but, by circumventing the law’s "transaction 
structure,"
100
 she triggers wasteful deployments of other resources by the 
possessor.  In Table 1's classification scheme, a move to a higher valuing 
thief looks like a "good shift," but it is not normatively desirable (even from 
an efficiency perspective) because of the costs involved in bringing it about.  
The costs of defending and reacting to defenses can also explain why a 
commons featuring a fixed quantity of a given resource may generate 
tragedy, even though it would seem to be a zero-sum game that implicates 
only matters of distribution. In fact, there is always a linked resource-
gathering commons that may be subject to tragedy, even if the underlying 
resource is not.
101
 Likewise, we can extend our understanding of defensive 
and reactive dissipation to encompass a wide variety of moves that may be 
made within the context of actual and prospective market transactions to 
gain more surplus from a given transaction. Strategic holdout problems can 
emerge where monopoly power is present, and free riding maneuvers may 
crop up when public goods are on offer.
102
  Even when private and 
relatively fungible goods are involved, consumers may still expend effort 
attempting to wring surplus from small increments of heterogeneity in 
identically priced items.
103
   
 
C.  Institutional Arrangements 
 
Although the discussion above abstracted away from institutional detail, 
societal arrangements for resource access can make it easier or harder for 
                                                 
99 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case Against Theft, 17 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 367 (1997); Fred S. McChesney, Boxed in: Economists and Benefits from Crime, 13 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 225, 227–28 (1993); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. 
ECON. J. 224, 228–30 (1967). 
100 See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in Nomos XXVII: Criminal Justice 289, 
301–03 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985). 
101 Fennell, supra note 52, at 922-24.   
102 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 52. 
103 See Yoram Barzel, Transaction Costs: Are They Just Costs?  141 J. INTERNATIONAL & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 4, 8-10 (1985).  Barzel observes that the seller is effectively “placing in the public domain his right over 
the differential between the more valuable units and the price charged.”  Id. at 9.     
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parties to complete or resist transfers. It is intuitive to think of property as 
an institutional arrangement directed at resisting transfers, and markets as 
an institutional arrangement directed at completing transfers. But of course 
transfers can also occur within the envelope of property ownership; internal 
governance can also structure access to resources. Indeed, transaction cost 
analysis has examined in great detail when it is cheaper to manage resource 
access outside of markets and within the structure of a firm.
104
   
Analysis similar to that which has been applied to the question of firm 
organization can also be applied to more fundamental questions of property 
rights configuration.  How permanent and exclusive should the pathways be 
that link users and resources? Who gets to sever relationships between 
resources and their users, or reroute resources to other users, and under 
what circumstances? When and how can packages of entitlements be split 
up and transferred separately, or aggregated together and moved as a unit?  
Considering these questions reveals that the law is involved not only in 
structuring access to resources, but also in structuring control over the 
institutional features that structure access to resources.
105
  Here it becomes 
helpful to speak functionally about the core institutional elements in play.  
Property rights operate to simultaneously grant and deny access to 
resources by identifying those who will be given a privileged relationship to 
a given resource.
106
  Encoded into these entitlements are rules about how 
one’s relationship with the entitlement may be altered or maintained over 
time.  Following the distinction between exclusion and governance,
107
 we 
can distinguish between institutional elements that do the work of providing 
resource access by walling others out, and those that do their work by 
giving individuals access to resources in more fine-grained ways.   
Alienable property rights premised on boundary exclusion represent a 
gated wall that keeps the uninvited out, and allows insiders continual access 
to the resources within the wall.
108
 Walls are not the only way to manage 
resource access, however.  For example, a home’s co-owner might have a 
prioritized relationship to a particular part of the house, even if she cannot 
wall out her co-owners. Likewise, a commoner’s right to draw berries from 
a common supply under a complex rotation scheme tethers those resources 
                                                 
104 See sources cited supra note 22; see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the 
Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 (1998) (examining how access, in the absence of property rights, can produce 
incentives for investment).   
105 Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 93, at 1090-92 (observing that a decision must not only be made 
about who to entitle, but also about how to protect the entitlement). 
106 This section’s analysis owes a debt to ARNOLD M. FADEN, ECONOMICS OF SPACE AND TIME 215-17  
(1977) (discussing a set of broad-spectrum “barrier” technologies including “walls,” “brakes,” and “bindings” and 
explaining that “[t]he entire institution of private property may be construed as a system of selective barriers, 
denying access to all except those authorized by the owner of the property or those having special access rights”).   
107 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 
J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002). 
108 FADEN, supra note 106, at 215-16 (using the analogy of walls to discuss property); J.E. Penner, The 
“Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 744 (1996) (characterizing property as a "gate").   
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to her conceptually, even though she does not harbor them within a private 
walled garden. Property ownership often combines complex resource 
tethering within the walls with blunt exclusion of those outside.
109
 Where 
multiple activities are being undertaken simultaneously on differently 
scales, wall placement becomes an interesting and important problem.
110
   
Strong property rights protection (walls) are often conceptually paired 
with markets, a kind of chute for voluntarily moving resources to other 
parties. It is standard to assume that in a low transaction cost world, 
property and markets, or walls and chutes, are all we need.  But the walls 
and chutes themselves help to construct the transaction cost environment in 
which they will operate,
111
 and are themselves costly to construct and 
maintain.
112
  Further, some resources resist walling, whether because it is 
infeasible to subdivide a given resource system, or because a resource 
system has external effects that cannot be brought fully within the scope of 
any one owner. Chutes may also be ineffective conduits if the parties to a 
potential transfer fail to cooperate with each other, whether by strategically 
holding out for a better deal or attempting to free-ride on transfers to others.         
In addition to institutional arrangements for stopping and moving 
entitlements around, we have institutional mechanisms for aggregating and 
disaggregating sets of entitlements—various sorts of bindings and slicers.  
Consider first bindings.
113
  The economic analysis of law has been faulted 
for not paying sufficient attention to the optimal bundling of property 
rights.
114
 Getting the right elements together in one place (in anyone’s 
hands) is as much a challenge for efficiency as getting particular 
entitlements into the right party’s hands.  If property is configured in a way 
that puts together complementary elements (like access to the land and the 
right to farm it) then transactions to put these elements together will be 
unnecessary; instead, the entire useful chunk can be transacted over at one 
time.
115
  In fact, property law tends to group together certain entitlements in 
ways that may be intentionally resistant to unbundling. An anti-
fragmentation rationale has been invoked to explain a variety of doctrines, 
including minimum lot sizes and the rule against perpetuities.
116
   
The flip side of bindings are slicing mechanisms that can divide up 
                                                 
109 See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades 
and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 144 (1998) (describing "limited common property" as  "property on the 
outside, commons on the inside").   
110 See Ellickson, supra note 23, at 1332 (“Decisions on where to set land boundaries are fiendishly complex 
because most tracts of land are suited to multiple uses for which scale efficiencies vary”). 
111 See, e.g., Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 4. 
112 See Demsetz, supra note 23. 
113 See FADEN, supra note 106, at 216 (describing bindings as “mechanisms that prevent or limit the relative 
motion of different things”).   
114 See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 69. 
115 See id at S89.  
116 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173-82 (1999). 
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different elements of particular resource bundles. Just as property bundles 
may be suboptimally thin, they may also be are suboptimally thick and 
include elements that would be more valuably held by others.
117
 The 
subdivision of entitlements can effectively create new property interests, as 
where an access easement is carved out of a fee simple estate, or rights to 
pollute are parceled out in particular ways.  If optimal bundles of property 
are contingent on particular social, economic, and technological conditions, 
then bundling and unbundling will be necessary as time goes by, however 
well-calibrated the default bundles with which parties begin.  
Another question that property institutions address is when and why and 
how parties' access to resources ends and begins.  An access change might 
occur voluntarily through gifts, markets, abandonment, or destruction, or 
through sharing, loaning, delegating, and so on. Parties may also hold the 
power to involuntarily sever access channels between other people and the 
resources to which they are attached. Viewed broadly, much of what law 
does can be understood in terms of controlling who holds the power to slice 
and who has the power to resist it.  One of the most important powers in this 
vein involves splitting up the surplus associated with changes in resource 
access.  If nobody has the unilateral power to divide the surplus definitively, 
each of two (or more) transacting parties holds an effective veto over the 
change in the resource's ownership, use, or configuration.  Sometimes the 
law will step in and do the surplus-slicing itself, or designate who will be 
entitled to perform it within the context of a given deal.  Thus, the entire 
family of liability rules can be understood as specialized slicers.   
Costly walls, bindings, slicers, and chutes appear in a variety of 
institutional combinations.  They grapple, with varying degrees of success, 
with the core problems of unwanted transfers and nontransfers, and with the 
defensive and reactive moves that those problems prompt. And they 
introduce costs of their own, some of which are publicly borne, and some of 
which are privately borne.
118
 Recognizing that institutional features 
introduce as well as control costs is central to a taxonomic approach that 




 Law and economics scholars seem to be quite conscious of how 
institutional structures raise or lower the costs of giving high valuers access 
to resources.  An equally important point is that we should not expend too 
many resources in structuring access to resources. This means that 
                                                 
117 See Fennell, supra note 67, at 13-14 (explaining that property rights often comprise blocks of control that 
are suboptimally extensive).   
118 For example, governments must incur costs to regulate markets and run police departments and courts, 
and private parties must incur costs to keep track of ownership interests, to alter holdings, or to end their 
involvement with a given entitlement.   
119 Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 41 (noting relevance of prevention costs and administrative costs as well as 
accident costs). 
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institutional arrangements that make transactions cheaper may or may not 
be worthwhile. Taking a page from Coase, the government should not 
intervene to reduce transaction costs (just as it should not intervene to 
internalize externalities) unless we think that the market will underproduce 
the relevant product (transaction cost reductions, or cost internalization).  
Following Demsetz, we cannot infer from the persistence of prohibitively 
high transaction costs, nor from the persistence of externalities, that the 
market has failed. Some externalities should remain uninternalized 
(internalizing them costs too much), and some transaction costs should 
remain prohibitively high (lowering them costs too much).   
Legal scholars have skipped over this point for two reasons.  First is the 
tendency to focus on the costs of thing-misallocation and to ignore the costs 
that are saved by leaving those misallocations alone.  Second, there is really 
no doubt that transaction cost reductions (and reductions in other transfer 
and transfer avoidance costs) would be underproduced by markets and 
private actors working alone, so that some legal interventions are plainly 
warranted.  Yet this should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that 
transaction cost reductions are products like any other, ones that can 
become too expensive for society to purchase.
120
  Nor should we ignore the 
fact that problems of suboptimal resource access are heterogeneous and 
differentially responsive to legal interventions.  The next Part examines how 
attending to these points can produce payoffs for legal scholars.   
 
III. FROM TRANSACTION COSTS TO ACCESS IMPROVEMENTS 
 
The umbrella category of “resource access costs” offers a starting point 
for a new analytic approach.  It addresses the problem of underinclusiveness 
associated with transaction costs by taking into account all of the costs of 
transferring resources and of keeping them where they are, as well as the 
losses that are sustained when either of these costs becomes too large to 
bear. Constructing this category is only a first step, however.  On its own, it  
is too all-encompassing to be helpful in informing entitlement design or 
decisions about legal interventions.  For the same reason, it is not sufficient 
to simply expand the definition of transaction costs to encompass every 
element that grants, withholds, or regulates access to resources.  Applying a 
cost minimization function to all of civil society is not a tractable task.
121
   
                                                 
120There are further questions about how society should buy these reductions.  For example, mobile phones, 
computers, and speedy laser printers have dramatically reduced transaction costs. Although the  law played a role 
in their development, this was through general support for innovation, not through measures directed at reducing 
transaction costs.    
121 This point highlights a baseline issue that lurks in transaction cost analysis. The Coasean baseline is, 
implicitly, a "perfect" resource allocation in which all things are with their highest valuers. Transaction costs 
disrupt this pristine world.  Broadening our focus to all resource access costs does not on its own alter this 
baseline, though it does make clearer its artificiality: we now must conceptualize a baseline world in which no 
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Instead, it is necessary to identify with precision the resource access 
improvements that particular changes or interventions can buy us, and trace 
the costs of these moves.   
This Part makes a start on that project. Subpart A focuses on a 
distinction crucial to entitlement design:  the degree to which the resource 
access costs in question stem from efforts to wrest something (including 
surplus) from another party, rather than efforts to coordinate with another 
party in the transfer or nontransfer of an entitlement.
122
  Subpart B identifies 
a subset of costs that are not products of unsolved collective action 
problems, and that the law is therefore not well-positioned to cost-
effectively address.  In so doing, it addresses the overinclusiveness problem 
in the transaction cost category. Subpart C shows how these distinctions, 
and the resource access cost approach more generally, generates a set of 
insights about efforts to reduce, counter, or circumvent the costs of 
completing transactions.   
 
A.    Conflict and Coordination Costs 
   
As the earlier discussion emphasized, the owner (or current possessor) 
of a resource may or may not be the high valuer.  When a nonowner comes 
along, the two parties may or may not agree with each other on whether a 
transfer should occur, or they may agree on the fact of the transfer but 
disagree on the price. In competitive markets where prices are 
nonnegotiable, it is entirely possible for both parties to be in full agreement 
on transacting at a given price; their only problem lies in coordinating the 
transaction.  In many other cases, the absence of established prices means 
that parties who both desire a transfer may nonetheless disagree about how 
the surplus from that event should be divided.
123
  
Thus, sometimes interactions over resources involve only coordination, 
sometimes they involve only conflict, and in most cases of interest to legal 
scholars, they involve both. Entitlement design must, therefore, grapple 
                                                                                                                            
property or other institutional elements exist, but in which all resources are nonetheless with their highest valuers.  
122 The distinction between conflict and coordination (as well as the way in which the two blend together) 
can be seen in game theoretic formulations.  See e.g.. Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma: 
Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009) (emphasizing the significance of 
coordination games in modeling legal problems); see also Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and 
Economics, 91 B.U.L. REV. 43, 62-65 (2011) (observing how conflict enters into coordination games).  
123 It would also be possible for both parties to wish a nontransfer of the underlying resource but for them to 
disagree about how the surplus from that nonevent should be divided. I am omitting this possibility from the table 
for simplicity since the law usually specifies the division of surplus in that case in rather strong terms: the owner 
or prior occupier gets to keep the surplus associated with the nontransfer.  Nonowner attempts to extract surplus 
for a nontransfer (by, say, taking a person or chattel hostage and demanding a ransom) tend to be criminally 
punished. That situation is quite different from one in which a party already owns a particular right (such as to 
make noise, locate a stable, or exclude a crane from the airspace) and attempts to obtain a large amount of surplus 
from its transfer; this scenario fits easily into the center square of Table 2.  See Larissa M. Katz, A Principle of 
Abuse of Property Right, YALE L.J. (forthcoming), draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1417955; Daniel B. 
Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2011).  
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with both types of resource access costs.  Carol Rose made just this point in 
distinguishing Type I and Type II transaction costs, where the former 
represent what I here call coordination costs, and the latter represent conflict 
costs.
124
 I extend her typology to include not only the costs involved in 
moving entitlements, but also the costs in keeping them in place.  Table 2 
lays out the possibilities.  The cells with x’s in them are incoherent.    
 
 
Table 2:  Conflict and Coordination 
 
 Nonowner                       
      
Owner 
Wants Transfer 





































Much of the confusion surrounding transaction costs goes to whether 
the term refers just to the costs of using markets to facilitate trade between 
willing buyers and sellers at set prices—that is, the costs incurred by parties 
whose interactions place them in the upper left “coordination square.”  As 
Table 2 suggests, this is only one possible type of interaction, and it does 
not describe many of the contexts that are most interesting to legal scholars. 
In contexts where set prices are not found and the parties must decide on 
their own how to divide the surplus (the center square in Table 2), both 
conflict and coordination costs are usually strongly implicated. For 
example, if I want to buy a car from you,
125
 we must find each other, decide 
when and where to meet, incur the costs of getting there, and bear the costs 
of the necessary paperwork to complete the transaction (I must write a 
check, you must sign over the title).  These are all coordination costs. 
Before the transfer can take place, I must also gather quite a bit of 
                                                 
124 See Rose, supra note 17, at 2184-88; see also Langlois, supra note 17 (drawing a parallel distinction). 
125 Robert Cooter also uses a car-buying example to distinguish what he terms "transaction costs" from 
strategic behavior.  See Cooter, supra note 44, at 17. 
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information about the car and about the price you are willing to accept. 
Otherwise, I cannot be certain that the trade is one advantageous to me.  
Likewise, you must gather information from me about the price I am willing 
to pay to be sure that the trade will be advantageous to you.  
This information-gathering still involves coordination between us 
because of our common interest in completing a worthwhile deal, but the 
specter of conflict is beginning to loom. The deal, if it is worth doing, will 
produce at least some surplus. That raises the question of how the surplus 
will be divided, and here our interests conflict.
126
 We may strategically 
misrepresent our reservation prices in an effort to gain more of the available 
surplus.  If your car is unique and my desire for it is unquenchable, and if I 
am the only buyer within range and your need for cash is pressing, we may 
find ourselves locked in a bilateral monopoly situation. We incur conflict 
costs as we wrangle over how low or high each of us will go.   
There are other conflict costs in this story as well.  I will worry that you 
are misrepresenting some of the attributes of the car in an effort to either 
gain more of the surplus, or indeed to generate a transfer in your own favor 
under circumstances that will leave me worse off.  Whether or not you are 
actually engaging in misrepresentations or covering over the car’s defects, I 
will likely incur defensive costs to try to verify its attributes, as by running a 
Carfax check on it, or taking it to a mechanic of my own before buying it.  
You may react to my defensive moves by expending greater resources to 
fool me (and Carfax, and my mechanic).  Conversely, you will worry that 
when I take the car for a test drive I will simply make off with it.  You will 
incur defensive costs to try to determine if I’m a good type before handing 
over the keys.  You might require me to show you my driver’s license, and 
perhaps hand over the keys to my own car as a “hostage.”  If I am in fact 
bent on making off with the car, I might incur costs to thwart your defensive 
moves, causing you to be even more cautious. 
Once we recognize how the potential for conflict infects the transaction 
process, it also becomes apparent that even some of the costs we earlier 
identified as “coordination costs” occur in the shadow of conflict and are 
shaped by the potential for conflict.
127
  For example, we may incur extra 
costs (in waiting or transportation) to meet in broad daylight in a public 
place rather than in the nearest dark alleyway at night—and these costs 
would be unnecessary if we fully trusted each other.  Similarly, you might 
demand a cashier’s check from me rather than a personal check if you are 
not sure I am good for the purchase price, and this will cause me to make an 
extra trip to the bank.  More fundamentally, the signing over of title is 
                                                 
126 See id. 
127 To put the point a little differently, conflict costs must be controlled in certain ways before the prospect of 
cooperation even becomes possible.  The property rights literature emphasizes the role of secure rights in  
facilitating trade.   
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necessary only in a world where disputes might arise over who is to be 
granted access to the resource. 
A similar blending of coordination costs and conflict costs can be found 
in many other situations. Consider the familiar polluting factory that creates 
misery for nearby residents far in excess of the value that the factory 
creates. When high transaction costs are cited as a reason why an inefficient 
outcome could persist, legal scholars mean more than just that it is 
logistically difficult for the residents to communicate with each other and 
coordinate a buyout, although they do mean that.  The transaction cannot 
occur without resolving conflicts that arise among the residents over who 
should contribute and in what amounts (free rider problems) and conflicts 
between the factory and the residents as a whole over the division of 
surplus.   
Despite the fact that conflict costs and coordination costs are often 
blended, it is useful to distinguish them conceptually.  In some settings, 
either conflict or coordination costs will dominate while the other category 
of costs is absent or trivial.  Notably, conflict costs do not produce much 
difficulty when a transaction is conducted in a competitive market backed 
by strong protections against force and fraud. Haggling is entirely absent 
because the surplus division is fixed in advance; the price is set at marginal 
cost.  Transactions are costly (at the margin) in this context only if the cost 
of coordinating is high relative to the available surplus. Very often this is 
the case. For example, I buy fewer pairs of shoes than I would if transacting 
over them was costless. The shoe market is highly competitive, and I have 
no fear of shoe fraudsters.  It is just really a hassle to bother with shopping 
for them. I am not acting inefficiently when I forgo a purchase that, were it 
costless, I would have made.
128
  This is Demsetz’s point.  
In other contexts, conflict costs dominate and coordination costs are 
trivial.  For example, suppose I plan to build a high privacy fence and my 
next door neighbor would rather I didn’t.  Assume the law is clear on my 
right to build, but my neighbor will lose more than I will gain if I go 
through with it.  In theory, he could pay me some amount not to build.  We 
would have no trouble finding each other, communicating with each other, 
or traveling to transact with each other; we already live next door, and no 
third parties (let us assume) are affected.  If we cannot come to terms, it is 
because one or both of us wants more surplus (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) 
from the transaction than the other is willing to cede.  
Conflict costs and coordination costs also come into play in various 
mixtures where resource access is structured without the use of market 
transactions. Conflict costs, along with defensive and reactive behavior in 
response to it, are incurred whenever parties resort to force or fraud to 
                                                 
128 Here, I set aside the (likely) possibility that my failure to do more shoe shopping inflicts harm on others.       
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allocate resources to themselves outside of approved channels. Similarly, 
conflict costs are incurred when parties shirk or overappropriate in a 
commons, or react to such actions in kind or through other defensive or 
reactive moves. Organizational structures that give a single owner authority 
over a range of uses and decisions may avoid the need for transactions, but 
will typically also produce conflict costs when agents try for larger shares 
of surplus and principals respond to those attempts. Coordination costs will 
be incurred in many of these nonmarket settings as well.  Even the most 
faithful agent must be directed, and this takes time and effort.  Likewise, 
even commoners who have no thought of taking advantage of each other 
must spend time and energy devising a workable system for sharing access 
to resources.  
Finally, coordination costs dominate when both parties desire a 
nontransfer, as shown in Table 2’s lower right corner.  This is a ubiquitous 
state of affairs.  Most people, most of the time, have no desire to take 
resources from each other by encroaching on property rights.  Yet, as Henry 
Smith and Tom Merrill have argued, steering clear of property violations 
(inadvertent transfers) requires that both owners and nonowners use 
information.
129
  The way in which property rights are configured and 
protected will affect the content and legibility of that information, and 
hence will impact the costs of coordination that the parties incur in avoiding 
unwanted transfers.
130
   
Property design choices can be used to influence both conflict and 
coordination costs.  However, features that have a salutary effect on some 
subset of these costs may have either no impact or a countervailing impact 
on other costs. The question that entitlement designers must confront is 
whether a given feature saves more in net conflict or coordination costs, and 
in the associated improvements in resource access, than it costs.  Table 3 
presents again the conflict and coordination costs we saw in Table 2, but 
with bracketed indications of the types of entitlement features that would be 
conducive to overcoming them.      
 
                                                 
129 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 139. 
130 Merrill and Smith make this point when discussing the role of the numerus clausus in controlling 
information costs.  See id. 
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Table 3:  Conflict, Coordination, and Design Features 
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Owner 
Wants Transfer 




















   
 




























Much of the disagreement about entitlement design comes down to a 
debate between those who focus on the upper left square, where 
transactability features are key, and those who focus on the center square, 
where surplus-dividing features play a primary role.
131
  Each group claims 
to be talking about reducing transaction costs, but they are talking about 
different things—different facets of the overall enterprise of minimizing 
resource allocation costs. While scholars concerned with coordination costs 
have emphasized the importance of transactability features, scholars 
concerned with conflict costs have emphasized mechanisms (notably 
liability rules) that control struggles over surplus. Recognizing that these 
two very different strategies address different sets of problems represents an 




As Table 3 illustrates and as this essay has emphasized, however, we 
must be concerned not only with market transactions but also with other 
                                                 
131 It is true that the coordination element in the center square could also make transactability features 
relevant, but there are two complications that make this unclear.  First, surplus-dividing features often take the 
form of transaction substitutes, like liability rules, that render some or all of the transactability features moot.  
Second, easier transactability may actually exacerbate the problems associated with strategic behavior.  See 
Cooter, supra note 44, at 28.  Thus, it is not clear that a well-defined and highly transactable property package will 
actually produce more efficient results than a more cumbersome one, where the real impediment is strategic 
behavior.   
132 See Rose, supra note 17, at 2184-88. 
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sorts of transfers and with efforts to keep transfers from occurring.  The 
counterpart of transactablity for parties who are both trying not to engage in 
a transfer is rendered here as legibility.  Thus, clearly marked boundary 
lines and clear systems of titling would help owners and nonowners to 
coordinate in ways that avoid unwanted (by both parties) transfers from the 
former to the latter. The ability of an owner to resist a transfer to a 
nonowner who desires one, and the ability of a nonowner to resist a transfer 
from an owner who wants one can both be addressed by giving parties veto 
rights. These veto rights, in turn, contribute to the strategic interactions in 
the center square when both parties wish a transaction but disagree on the 
surplus division.    
Some standard features of property entitlements, such as well-defined 
exclusionary edges, can advance more than one goal at once.  
Transactability features may double as aids to legibility, by making it easier 
for other parties to steer clear. The genius of property lies in precisely this 
double-sided accomplishment: stopping resource movement while at the 
same time facilitating it. State-enforced exclusion rights not only facilitate 
coordination over nontransfers, they also address conflicts that take the 
form of misappropriation.  However, not all of the familiar characteristics of 
property entitlements reduce all of the costs in the table.  Significantly, 
transactability features are not designed to, and generally do not, ease fights 
over surplus. They might even make things worse.
133
  By the same token, 
some legal interventions are designed to address conflict costs (liability 
rules, which cut through fights over surplus, are a good example) but do not 
reduce coordination costs and might increase them.
134
    
This analysis shows that private property arrangements solve certain 
kinds of resource access problems very well. Transactability and legibility 
facilitate voluntary transfers and nontransfers, respectively, where 
coordination is the relevant obstacle.  Private property rights also handle 
certain kinds of conflict well, by giving owners and nonowners alike a veto 
over transfers that are not mutually desired.  But these property entitlements 
embed another source of conflict, one that inheres in the conscious choice to 
leave unassigned the division of surplus upon transfer. This embedded 
incompleteness follows from the choice to make the owner the residual 
claimant, a position granted to the party whose inputs are the hardest to 
measure and who therefore needs some other way of being incentivized to 
invest optimally.
135
 Here, the incentive takes the form of property rule 
protection, which grants the owner the right to collect the returns that are 
generated  unless and until she gets a price she likes. 
                                                 
133 See Cooter, supra note 44, at 28. 
134 See  Rose, supra note 17, at 2187-88. 
135 See Smith, supra note 159, at 1795-97; see also YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 78-79 (2d ed., 1997) (discussing property holders as residual claimants). 
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The relevance of investment incentives flows in turn from the owner’s 
ownership of her own human capital and control over her other assets, 
which must be voluntarily shifted to a given endeavor.  This is a form of 
conflict between the interests of the individual and the interests of society.  
In a world of zero transaction costs,  appropriate contracts could be written 
to provide for all imaginable contingencies. There would be no need to 
grant anyone a residual claim over anything, and rewards for desired 
investments could be set using the information that would be costlessly 
available in such a world.
136
  Property rights would become unnecessary, 
and with it, the problem of dividing surplus.   
Here we see again how property can be understood as both a response to 
and a cause of positive transaction costs.  The more important observation, 
however, is that all property arrangements involve costs.  As such, we must 
examine what various design features buy us (in, say, transactability and the 
unblocking of human capital), and what we have to give up (in the potential 
blocking of resources that follows from leaving surplus from future 
transfers unassigned). Matching design features to resource access 
impediments offers a clearer way of making these sorts of tradeoffs.    
 
B.  Identifying Uncaptured Surplus 
 
Another way of subdividing the umbrella category of resource access 
costs is to distinguish those costs that the product of unsolved collective 
action problems from those that are not.  An unsolved collective action 
problem is not a sufficient condition for legal intervention, as we will see, 
but it is a necessary condition.  Unless there is some uncaptured surplus on 
the table that the law can help parties obtain, there is no room for 
improvement (at least along efficiency lines) in resource access.  Directing 
more resources towards completing or resisting transfers in the absence of 
untapped surplus can only lead to an inefficient overproduction of transfers 
or of transfer resistance, relative to other goods and services.   
Recognizing this point addresses the overinclusiveness built into the 
concept of transaction costs.  It is standard for legal scholars (including 
myself) to reflexively equate thing-misallocation with uncaptured surplus.  
After all, the resource could be used more efficiently by someone else. But  
there is no surplus available to be captured if fixing the misallocation will 
cost more than it is worth.  This will be the case only if the impediments to 
the thing's efficient allocation embed inefficiencies themselves.  And there 
will only be a justification for legal intervention if these are inefficiencies 
that the law is in a good position to (further) address.  This will not always 
be the case.   
                                                 
136 See CHEUNG, supra note 68, at 37. 
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Consider the following set of costs:  the length of time it takes a human 
being to read a paragraph of text, the cost (in time and gasoline and 
automobile wear and tear) to travel to a meeting, the cost of printing out a 
contract, the ease with which a phone call can be made, the cost to treat a 
nose broken in a trespass dispute, the price of barbed wire.  In an important 
sense, these costs are "blunt" insofar as they do not differ in kind from the 
costs of producing other goods and services, or of carrying out other 
activities.      
Blunt costs are not immutable.  On the contrary, many of them are 
highly amenable to reduction through technological advances.  Nor is it 
correct to say that these costs have nothing to do with law.  There are many 
things that law and social policy do at a broad level of generality that 
influence such costs. Governmental bodies provide transportation 
infrastructure and public education, and they determine city layouts and 
speed limits. The law broadly supports private innovation, which can lead to 
such transaction-relevant innovations as better mobile phones, faster laser 
printers, or better fencing. Still other inputs into transactions (like paper) are 
the product of competitive market forces and general laws that govern the 
manufacture and sale of products.
137
 
The point, then, is not that these costs are impervious to governmental 
influence, but rather that these influences represent existing solutions  to 
collective action problems that operate at a broad level of generality.  Those 
solutions may be quite imperfect, and it is entirely fitting that legal (and 
other) scholars should revisit them.  But because of the level of generality at 
which these solutions operate, further alterations would at least 
presumptively apply broadly as well, rather than be uniquely targeted at 
completing or resisting transfers as such.  For example, the law would be 
concerned about distortions in the paper market caused by paper mill 
pollution, whether the paper in question is used to write a contract, make a 
paper airplane, or draft a novel. Likewise, innovation policy does not 
distinguish between mobile phone advances that make it easier to call a sick 
friend or to close a major deal. Public education is valued not only because 
it lets people transact more easily, but also because it makes people better 
voters and citizens, and prepares them to work in a wide variety of jobs—
including jobs producing goods and services other than transactions.  There 
is no reason to expect a transfer-specific legal intervention to be an 
appropriate counter to blunt transaction costs, absent some additional, 
unsolved collective action problem that uniquely plagues transfers or 
transfer resistance.  
                                                 
137 For example, their manufacture, like that of any other product, may impose externalities. This reinforces 
Demsetz’s point that transactions are products like any other.  If making widgets creates smoke that makes us 
consider the entitlement status of air quality surrounding the widget factory, so too should we be on the lookout 
for externalities produced in the course of making transactions, or making their inputs. 
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Blunt factors cannot be dismissed entirely, however, because they 
interact with factors that are highly amenable to targeted legal interventions. 
Even if the inherent costliness of factors like phone calls or fencing is 
determined by a combination of market forces and broad-based features of 
the legal and social context, their prevalence in ordering resource access can 
be directly affected by transaction-specific legal rules and entitlement 
design features.  For example, if the law’s requirements as to titling and 
bills of sale shorten or lengthen the meeting or alter the amount of text that 
has to be read or written to finish a trade, the blunt costs associated with the 
deal would be influenced accordingly.  
Even more significantly, legal rules and assignment protocols influence 
the need to engage in transactions in the first place, which determines 
whether costs, including blunt ones, will be incurred at all.  Thus, in rem 
rights avoid many separate transactions with nonowners (saving countless 
pieces of paper, phone calls, and so on), while other features like 
standardized property forms or property registries, are thought to reduce the 
amount of time spent reading and researching.  The same points might be 
made about transfer resistance.  Some design features, such as strong 
exclusion rights, stand in for self-help and may, for instance, allow owners 
to get by with clear property markers rather than unscaleable walls. 
Similarly, certain organizational forms that the law might encourage or 
discourage can reduce the total amount of transfer resistance necessary 
within a particular realm.
138
 
In all these instances and many more, we should be on the lookout for 
some kind of collective action problem that stands unsolved which law 
would be in a position to address (or to address better, if the existing law 
produces suboptimal results).  Often such a problem does exist.  Parties may 
have difficulty coordinating if property rights are ill-defined or 
insufficiently standardized.
139
 Or they may have trouble reaching agreement 
due to holdout or free-rider problems. Collective action problems in the 
political process may also produce suboptimal transfer requirements—as 
well as suboptimal transfers.  Or outdated entitlement systems may stick in 
place because there is no good mechanism to alter them, and no market 
incentive for anyone to devise such a mechanism. There might be a new 
entitlement form that would benefit many millions of people that cannot get 
off the ground because of coordination difficulties, or an unnecessary 
transfer requirement that parties cannot get rid of without governmental 
assistance. Or many uncoordinated instances of private self help (organized 
                                                 
138 The point here is similar to the geometric one often made about fencing and the thermodynamic one often 
made about gloves versus mittens.  Similarly, if property holdings can be expanded, it is no longer necessary to 
separately fence off smaller operations and resist transfers between them.  See Ellickson, supra note 23, at 1332. 
139 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).   
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within private residential communities, for example) may have reduced the 
value that people can derive from their larger communities.   
Although blunt costs and costs that are amenable to targeted 
interventions intermingle and interact in practice, the distinction between 
them is important. The reason goes back to Demsetz’s critique. If only blunt 
resource access costs are in the picture, then targeted legal interventions are 
not called for, nor is there any reason to lament the existence of the costs 
themselves.  This will be the case in many categories of market exchange 
where there is no feasible prospect of altering allocation protocols so as to 
obviate the need for the transactions altogether, and few ways in which 
entitlement design interacts with the blunt costs of transacting.  Shoe 
shopping is again a good example.  There is no feasible way to simply 
assign me the shoes that I value most highly, and all of the impediments in 
the picture (the distance I must travel to and from the store, and the time it 
takes to identify likely shoes, obtain versions of them in likely sizes, try 
them on, make a selection, wait in line, and complete the purchase) are ones 
that targeted legal interventions can do relatively little to influence.  This 
makes the case for context-specific interventions a weak one, despite the 
abiding presence of prohibitively high transaction costs.   
Legal scholars’ conventional focus on transaction costs has in some 
ways been too narrow, but this analysis shows that it has also been in 
another way too broad. Some costs that fall under the heading of transaction 
costs do not make out a good case for legal intervention or even sustained 
scholarly attention. Yet we presently lack a good vocabulary for 
distinguishing the shoe case from instances in which transaction costs are 
highly amenable to reduction through legal innovation.  The absence of an 
unsolved collective action problem offers a useful basis for ruling out 
legally irrelevant transaction costs.   
The fact that an unsolved collective action problem is in the picture does 
not always argue for legal intervention, however.  Perhaps the problem 
cannot be cost-effectively solved through law, or (to put it another way) 
cannot be solved without producing larger negative impacts on other things 
that are connected to the problem at hand.
140
  In particular, we must be 
mindful of how attempts to solve one collective action problem can 
undermine existing arrangements that address other collective action 
problems.
141
  The next section further refines the conditions for intervention 
by reframing transaction cost reductions as societal purchases.
142
    
                                                 
140 See Schlag, supra note 8, at 1688-89 (discussing the role of indivisibilities in addressing transaction 
costs); COASE, supra note 47, at 25-26 (recognizing this point in the context of contract formalities). 
141 This is the essential lesson contained in Rose's examination of Type I and Type II transaction costs.  
Rose, supra note 17, at 2184-88. She critiques Ayres and Talley for not appreciating the way in which addressing 
Type II costs can run up Type I costs by partly dismantling a property system that goes a great distance to control 
(what I here call) coordination costs.  See id.   
142 We might make a similar set of points about purchasing transfer resistance cost reductions. I focus only 
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C.  Purchasing Transaction Cost Reductions 
 
Demsetz has usefully suggested that we view transactions as products 
like any other.
143
  It costs something to produce them, and their production 
should not be undertaken unless it generates benefits in excess of those 
costs. In other words, the resources that might be used to make a transaction 
might be better employed making something else, like a widget. For this 
reason, the mere existence of high transaction costs does not in itself 
bespeak inefficiency, much less make out a case for legal intervention.  It 
should, however, push us to ask two questions: (1) under what conditions 
can the market be expected to undersupply (or oversupply) transactions? 
and (2) are other methods of accomplishing the ends of transactions (getting 
or keeping resources in the hands of a high-valuing user) being 
underprovided or overprovided relative to the cost savings they produce?   
The first question goes to whether collective action problems or market 
failures make some inputs into transactions unduly expensive, or cause 
some positive externalities of transactions to go uninternalized.  The second 
question examines the case for legal interventions that would render certain 
classes of transactions unnecessary (or more necessary).  Both questions can 
be more easily approached by taking the Demsetzian point one step further 
and viewing transaction cost reductions as products that the law can 
purchase, whether by reducing the cost of inputs, increasing the internalized 
benefits of transactions, or making the need for the transaction moot 
through the use of a substitute. Whether it is worth purchasing those 
reductions depends on what they cost and what they do for us.  And this 
inquiry requires that we be precise about which impediments to efficient 
resource allocation certain transaction cost reductions are capable of 
addressing.   
We must first confront an ambiguity in what we mean by transaction 
cost reductions.  We might mean that individual transactions are subsidized 
so that their private cost falls even though their social cost remains 
unchanged. Or we might instead mean that individual transactions are 
streamlined in real terms, as through a legal rule that removes a procedural 
requirement, or some form of standardization that makes transacting easier.  
Or we might mean that entire classes of potential transaction costs are 
sidestepped because transactions are no longer necessary to bring actors 
together with (or keep them together with) the resources for which they are 
the high valuers.  Each of these approaches will have its own sets of costs. 
                                                                                                                            
on transaction cost reductions in the interest of space, and because of their prevalence in law and economics 
analysis. 
143 DEMSETZ, supra note 7, at 109-10.   




A naive response to the reality that transaction costs can separate high 
valuers from resources might be to simply subsidize transactions.  Suppose 
that after misreading Coase, the government decided to start a “transaction 
cost counterpunch” initiative in which individuals could get their 
transaction costs rebated from a central fund. Citizens would be invited to 
turn in records on the time and money spent transacting, in the same way 
workers turn in receipts to an employer for reimbursement.  Even assuming 
the scheme could be perfectly enforced and all efforts at fraud deterred, this 
would not be a good idea.  Just as reimbursing for transportation costs 
would lead people to overuse transportation inputs to the exclusion of 
cheaper alternatives, reimbursing for transactions would lead to too many, 
and too costly, transactions.  High-valuers might be united with "things" 
more frequently as a result, but the subsidized transactions themselves 
would pull resources away from higher-valued uses at an even greater rate, 
generating net losses. Getting rid of (private, realized) transaction costs 
would be a recipe for inefficiency, not efficiency.   
If an across-the-board transaction subsidy scheme seems suspect, what 
about a more tailored approach that subsidizes certain kinds of transactions?  
We might start by asking whether there is any reason to think that the 
transactions in question are being underproduced by the private market. 
This might be the case where transactions generate significant positive 
externalities.
 144
  A subsidy in such a context would be a standard Pigouvian 
move. A recent example is found in the idea of “agglomeration bonuses” 
offered to owners of contiguous land parcels who simultaneously agree to 
retire their lands.
145
  In this case, the sweetener for private agreement is 
added onto an existing subsidy scheme in recognition of the larger public 
benefits accruing from contiguous rather than scattered habitat.  But the 
                                                 
144 Transactions might also be underproduced if the government is already taxing or otherwise burdening 
them.  In such an instance, the subsidy might address the artificial suppression of demand and restore matters to 
the pre-burden baseline. An obvious question is why it would ever be more cost effective to counteract the initial 
burden than to eliminate it. This might be the case if the burdens on the transaction came in the form of incentives 
for appropriate action within the context of the transaction.  For example, Nuno Garoupa and Chris Sanchirico 
point out that certain ways of structuring legal rules can act as transaction taxes by reducing joint surplus. See 
Nuno Garoupa and Chris William Sanchirico, Decoupling as Transaction Taxes, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 469 (2010) .  
An invariant inducement to enter into such a transaction could counter the distortive effects of the incentive 
scheme without undoing the scheme itself.  But see id. at 486-87 (noting problems with this approach).   
145 See Gregory M. Parkhurst et al., Agglomeration Bonus: An Incentive Mechanism to Reunite Fragmented 
Habitat for Biodiversity Conservation, 41 ECOL. ECON. 305 (2002); see also Todd G. Olson et al., The Habitat 
Transaction Method: A Proposal for Creating Tradable Credits in Endangered Species Habitat, in BUILDING 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 27, 28-30 (Hank Fischer & Wendy Hudson, eds., 
1994) (describing and depicting the "habitat transaction method," which adjusts the value assigned to a given 
"habitat patch" based on its degree of contiguity and configuration); Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species, A 
New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 20-29 (2007) (discussing and critiquing 
the "habitat transaction method" and variations on it). 
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existence of externalities does not always provide definitive guidance.  This 
is because we must ask a further question, following Demsetz: whether the 
transactions necessary to internalize the externality in question are 
themselves subject to private underproduction. Underproduction of such 
internalizing transactions cannot be inferred from the mere persistence of an 
externality, since externalities cost something to internalize and may not be 
worth internalizing in a given instance.  
This becomes apparent when we recognize that private owners may 
choose to leave goods in the commons, even when there are no collective 
action problems that stand in the way of defining and enforcing property at 
a finer grain. Demsetz gives the example of a parking lot adjacent to a 
shopping area.
146
  It would be possible to propertize the parking spots and 
charge a fee for their use; indeed, this happens all the time in urban areas.  
This will mean fewer parking spaces (because people overconsume a zero-
priced commodity) and thus fewer costs involved in creating parking lots.  
But it will also mean higher transaction costs because people have to pay 
each time they park.  As Demsetz explains, “while we have reduced the 
resources committed to constructing parking spaces, we have increased 
resources devoted to market exchange.  We may end up allocating more 
resources to the provision and control of parking than had we allowed free 
parking because of the resources needed to conduct transactions.”147 In 
short, creating and enforcing short-term property interests in the individual 
spaces may not be worth it to anyone.
148
  The same point holds when we 
move outside the ownership envelope of a single owner. 
Even if we feel quite certain that a given kind of transaction is being 
underproduced, a subsidy may not be helpful.  We would need to know why 
it is being underproduced.  A subsidy might work quite well to cushion the 
costs of coordination between willing buyers and sellers (paying them for 
the time it takes to meet, for instance), but not at all well to address the 
costs of conflict (the desire to extract disproportionate surplus from a deal). 
As Cooter has noted, reducing certain kinds of transaction costs can actually 
have a pernicious effect where strategic holdout behavior is at issue.
149
 The 
cheaper it is to transact, the lower the opportunity cost of wrangling over 
                                                 
146 Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. L. & ECON. 11, 14-15 (1964).   
147 Id. at 14.   
148 Put into the terms introduced above, the costs that stand in the way of reducing parking privileges to 
entitlements are blunt ones, insofar as the law already has devised a basic framework that would allow for the 
enforcement of private rights to the spaces.  If these blunt costs are not worth paying, that suggests no 
inefficiency.  Of course, the fact that they are not worth paying today does not mean they will not be worth paying 
tomorrow, if technology, demand, or other factors should change in ways that make metering the parking less 
costly.  See  Eirik Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory, A Survey of Recent 
Literature, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 1137, 1145 (1972) (observing that parking meters would reduce the costs of 
transacting over rights to individual parking spaces).  
149 Cooter, supra note 44, at 28 (“In fact, it is cheaper to engage in strategic behavior when communication is 
inexpensive.”).     
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surplus, and hence the more of it we are likely to see. 
 
2. Streamlining  
 
If subsidies seem like an often unhelpful approach to the problem of 
high transaction costs, we might turn our attention to more broad-based 
measures and expenditures that have the effect of making market 
coordination less expensive. Consider again government investments in 
transportation and communication infrastructure, the public education 
system, the legal system, and the currency system.  Property rights comprise 
an especially interesting and important category of such transaction-cost-
lowering technologies. By creating a tradable commodity, a property 
entitlement, the cost of coordinating a transaction is diminished.  Within the 
broad category of property rights lie a number of specific “transactability 
features,” from land registries to standardization protocols to 
antifragmentation doctrines.  All of these things help reduce coordination 
costs.  
In each instance, we would want to make sure that the returns to 
investments are worth their cost—that is, capable of facilitating new 
transactions that will generate more surplus than was expended in the 
process.  We do have reason to suspect that the private market would 
undersupply many of the things that globally reduce transaction costs, to the 
extent those things take the form of public goods or goods with large 
network effects or spillovers. But streamlining costs something, and the fact 
that the charges are disbursed across the population should, if anything, 
make us more vigilant in comparing what we are getting with what we are 
giving up.
150
   
Not all streamlining takes the form of advances in infrastructure or 
institutions. It might instead involve simply rolling back the formal 
requirements associated with transactions. Coase mentions one example: 
easing the requirements for completing a contract.
151
 For example, land 
transactions would be cheaper to accomplish were it not for the Statute of 
Frauds, which requires certain formalities, including the use of a written 
document.  Likewise, various consumer transactions could be completed 
more quickly if merchants did not have to comply with disclosure 
requirements, offer “cool down” periods, and so on.   
Coase rightly questions whether a given change in the contractual rule is 
worth it, when considered across the full run of cases to which it would 
                                                 
150 An insight of public choice theory is that scattered impacts may elicit a muted political response relative 
to those concentrated on a small cohesive group.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND 
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991) (discussing the role of interest groups in the political 
process). 
151 COASE, supra note 47, at 25-26. 
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apply.
152
  These formalities add to the costs of transactions, but are also 
thought to produce benefits.
153
  Many of these formalities are meant to keep 
consumers from unwittingly engaging in inefficient transactions—ones that 
leave them worse off—or to keep fraudsters from accessing resources 
outside of voluntary channels of trade. Against transaction cost savings, 
then, we must weigh the losses from value-reducing trades or 
misappropriations as well as associated forms of defensive, reactive, and 
institutional dissipation.  Put another way, we cannot analyze the effects on 
the costs of transfers without considering the effects on transfer resistance 
costs.   
 
3. Sidestepping  
 
Neither subsidies nor streamlining get rid of market transactions; they 
simply make market mechanisms less expensive for willing participants to 
use.  Such approaches generally address only coordination costs; they are 
simply not designed to deal with strategic behavior or other kinds of 
conflict costs.  A great deal of legal attention has focused on ways to bypass 
transactions altogether, primarily through liability rules.  Liability rules, in 
Calabresi and Melamed’s schema, permit transfers to occur on the unilateral 
initiative of one party upon payment of a stipulated amount to another 
party.
154
 These substitutes for transactions
155
 can avoid not only the 
coordination costs associated with transacting, but also strategic 
impediments to transacting—a type of conflict costs. More specifically, 
liability rules avoid struggles over surplus by setting a price. But, like every 
other approach to structuring resource access, liability rules have costs of 
their own. 
One set of concerns has been strongly associated with liability rules in 
the existing literature: the possibility that they will undercompensate, and 
the associated risk that they will transfer resources to low valuers and 
thereby discourage ex ante investments.  These possibilities represent costly 
resource misallocations.  But there are other costs associated with liability 
rules, ones that apply even when they achieve their goal of moving 
resources to a higher valuer.   In addition to the cost of setting up and 
running the liability rule regime, defensive and reactive dissipation may 
occur as parties attempt to protect their property against unilateral, 
undercompensated appropriation (or, alternatively, attract overcompensated 
                                                 
152 See id.  
153 See id.; see also Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 31, at 87.   
154 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 93, 1092, 1107. 
155 See Calabresi, supra note 41, at 69.  Liability rules do not  produce true transactions because they do not 
involve the voluntary participation of two or more parties, but instead allow one party to override the veto power 
of the other.   
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appropriation) through rent-seeking or otherwise.   
Liability rules are not the only substitutes for transactions. In addition to 
outright theft, there are a variety of legally approved transfers without 
compensation, such as adverse possession, prescription, and regulations that 
fall short of compensable takings. Here too we see how avoiding 
transactions introduces other conflict costs (defensive and reactive moves 
following invasion or the threat of invasion).
156
 To the risk of value-
reducing transfers (bad shifts) we must add costs that apply regardless of 
whether the transfer goes to a lower or higher valuing user. An especially  
interesting set of such costs is political in nature and relates to literatures on 
transition relief,
157
 as well as to Frank Michelman's notion of 
"demoralization costs."
158
   
All of these costs become implicated in entitlement design choices, 
including those choices that are justified by reference to transaction costs.  
For example, property regimes that grant owners a robust veto power across 
a wide range of dimensions allow owners to toggle among a wide variety of 
possible activities without having to transact with anyone first.
159
  But that 
same breadth of choice, which constrains the options left open to others, 
may lead to more conflicts than would a more constrained set of ownership 
vetoes.  In the absence of any incentive or mechanism for owners to head 
off future trouble,
160
 the ensuing clashes may well require coercive 
governmental intervention. To the claimed benefits of such large and blocky 
sets of rights, then, we must add the potentially greater need for coercive 
interventions to address the problems that such rights create.  And to this we 
must also add the political fallout from that coercion, as well as any costs 
that are incurred  to reduce that fallout to acceptable levels.    
There are at least two other ways to sidestep transactions.  One is for the 
law to simply assign resources to their high valuers, through court 
judgments or otherwise.
161
 The other is to create organizational structures 
that eliminate the need for transactions with others. Both of these 
possibilities have been extensively addressed in the existing transaction cost 
                                                 
156 This includes defensive moves that are the product of errors, or that represent overreactions.  See Jacque 
v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997) (homeowners refused to allow parties delivering a mobile 
home to cross their land to avoid dangerous conditions on an alternate route, based on an earlier experience of 
losing land to adverse possession).   
157 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 517 (1986); 
Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
391 (2010).  
158 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ‘Just 
Compensation’ Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-18 (1967). 
159 See generally Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719 (2004). 
160 Fennell, supra note 67 offers a proposal along these lines, whereby owners could receive a payment for 
alienating options on certain aspects of their property holdings, thus effectively downgrading certain aspects of 
their bundle to liability rule protection.   
161 This point connects to the one above about political costs, to the extent that the assignment disrupts 
expectations about entitlements.   
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literature.  I will mention just two points in this connection.  
First, property law plays an often unsung role in assigning resources to 
parties who are likely to be high valuers.  One way it does so is by creating 
durable sets of rights that extend forward indefinitely in time and run 
against all outsiders. Were it not for these features, a possessor could 
maintain possession moment to moment only by constantly paying 
everyone else to stay away, or engaging in more costly “transaction 
substitutes,” like violence or guarding.  We can thus see embedded in the 
durable structure of property a rebuttable presumption that possession today 
is complementary with possession tomorrow, and that if the current 
possessor is the high valuer today, she is most likely to be the high valuer 
tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow.
162
 Following this essay’s analysis, 
however, the durability of property rights should not be taken as a given 
simply because it eliminates the need for certain kinds of transactions; its 
overall impact on systems for providing access to resources must be 
assessed.  Durability reduces societal flexibility, and it does so in a way that 
may not be appropriately priced.
163
   
The second point is that choices about organizational structure or, 
analogously, the size and scope of property holdings, may not incorporate 
full social costs and benefits.  This is because there is a discontinuity in 
responsibility that occurs at the property line, with governance inside 
largely falling on private parties and governance outside largely falling on 
public entities. Parties can sidestep transactions by expanding their 
holdings, but this means giving up some in-kind subsidies, especially with 
respect to transfer resistance.  The result may be unwitting legal 
encouragement of particular organizational forms or spatial configurations, 
at least in the absence of countermeasures.  This point has received much 
less attention from legal scholars than has the potential impact of current 
configuration choices on later transactions.
164
   
 
IV. OBJECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
There are several objections that might be raised to the approach taken 
here.  Answering these objections suggests some ways in which the analysis 
might be extended. 
                                                 
162 This relates to property's trait of "persistence."  See Henry E. Smith, Property as a Law of Things, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1711-12 (2012).  We can find instances where the opposite presumption of non-persistence 
applies (think of vacation campsites, public restroom stalls, or seats on a thrill ride).  In these cases, it is assumed 
that value is maximized by rotating possession rather than leaving it perpetually with one person—but these are 
thinner slices of possession than many people would identify with property rights.   
163 See, e.g., T. Nicolaus Tideman, Integrating Land-Value Taxation with the Internalization of Spatial 
Externalities, 66 LAND ECON. 341, 347 (1990) (suggesting that landowners withdraw flexibility from a social 
fund, and suggesting a tax on the right to remain as a possible solution).   
164 See, e.g., Heller, supra note 9. 
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A.  Didn't We Know All This Already? 
 
The discussion above has been abstract and conceptual, and it is fair to 
ask how, or if, adopting a resource access costs approach would change the 
way legal scholars think and write about resource problems.  More to the 
point, does the analysis here tell us anything we didn't already know?  The 
answer is both yes and no. I do not claim to have discovered entirely new 
ground in advocating a resource access cost approach, and as the citations 
above indicate, greater minds than mine have collectively recognized the 
various points worked through here. But the current way of framing the 
problem runs counter to identifying useful solutions.  Whatever knowledge 
may be theoretically available in scattered places throughout the literature 
has not been brought together in a way that legal scholars can use.   
 The approach here adds analytic clarity in a manner analogous to other 
significant theoretical advances. Quite simply, it is possible to do an 
inefficiently good job of getting entitlements (“things”) to higher valuing 
users, or keeping them there. The idea of an inefficiently high level of law 
enforcement has been well-accepted since Gary Becker’s work on crime 
and punishment.
165
 Similarly, Guido Calabresi made the possibility of an 
inefficiently low level of accidents part of the standard operating equipment 
for the economic analysis of tort law.
166
  There should be a similar level of 
familiarity with the possibility of too many efficient thing-transfers, where 
this achievement draws too many resources into the resource-structuring 
process. Subsuming transaction costs into a broader inquiry into optimality 
in resource access helps to make this point intuitive.   
A resource access approach also emphasizes a basic parity among costs 
that is undermined by designating some subset of costs as "transaction 
costs" worthy of special attention.  The costs of moving resources to new 
owners are no more and no less problematic than the costs of keeping them 
in place when they should not be moved, or of altering them in ways that 
make them less useful.  Consider the metaphor of an ice block that melts in 
transit, which economists often use to illustrate transportation or transaction 
costs.
167
  Suppose we can reduce melt by loading a resource into a speedy 
                                                 
165 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170 (1968) 
(observing that the question of optimal enforcement can be "put equivalently, although more strangely, [as] how 
many offenses should be permitted and how many offenders should go unpunished?"). 
166 See CALABRESI, supra note 41. 
167 See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 17, at 1390 (discussing Paul Samuelson’s “famous iceberg model of 
transportation costs” in which “a certain amount of the iceberg melts away as it is transported—or, we might add, 
as it waits around while being exchanged”) [citing Paul A. Samuelson, The Transfer Problem and Transport 
Costs, II: Analysis of Effects of Trade Impediments, 64 ECON. J. 264 (1954)]   The caveat about the resource 
"waiting" to be exchanged can be extended:  a resource capable of throwing off a stream of value greater than that 
which its present possessor can capture has some of its value melt away if it is not transferred.  Additionally, 
guarding and other efforts to preserve the resource represent other sources of melt.   
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transport vehicle or slotting it into well-engineered chutes—that is, through 
intelligent entitlement design and market facilitation. We have made the 
resource easier to move, but we may not have improved resource access. 
For example, if we must chop resource units into blocks of standard size to 
ready them for transit, we may end up with resource transfers that look 
artificially cheap (in melt) if we forget to notice what they cost up front (in 
chop).  We might have been better off with less chop and more melt.  We 
might have been better off forgoing both chop and melt, if the surplus 
associated with the resource’s rearrangement is outstripped by the cheaper 
of these alternatives.  
This metaphor relates to a number of current debates in property, 
including choices between property rules and liability rules, and the degree 
to which property should come in standardized packages. We should be 
willing to accept less useful property rights in order to make them easier to 
handle—but only if when we gain more than we lose.  Appreciating this 
point turns transaction cost savings from a trump card into a conversation 
starter.  Ditching the term transaction costs to focus instead on meaningful 
subsets of cost will make the resulting conversations clearer and more 
useful.   
 
B.  Why Maximize Value? 
 
The analysis in this paper tries to improve how we think and talk about 
the efficiency of resource access. We would do better to speak more 
precisely about how property arrangements impede or facilitate access by 
high valuers to resources.  But it is also possible to read this paper as a first 
step toward a more radical rethinking of resource access questions.  By 
making clear that the real issue is not who shall own which entitlements, but 
rather who shall have access to which resources, the paper invites a deeper 
questioning of the efficiency inquiry's reliance on willingness to pay. 
The focus on transaction costs has led to a way of thinking about 
efficiency that uses market transactions as the elusive ideal, and suggests 
that other ways of accomplishing transfers merely stand in for those 
transactions when they become too costly. The goal is to mimic the 
outcomes we would get if transactions were not so expensive to produce, 
and those outcomes would be determined by willingness to pay.   Once we 
stop thinking about transactions as the prototype and instead examine how 
to optimally arrange access to resources, the question arises of why value 
(interpreted in terms of willingness to pay) should be the right metric.   
The question is a larger one than I can take up here.  But it is interesting 
that simply moving one step away from a focus on transaction costs 
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highlights the distributively conservative character of that focus. Indeed, we 
can view the need to use money as a marker as yet another bit of fallout 
from our positive transaction cost world—a stopgap measure that fills in as 
best it can, and at some positive social cost, for the world we would achieve 
if parties could transact based upon utility.  
To put the point a different way, we might follow Pierre Schlag's lead 
and consider an alternative to the Coase Theorem that starts with the 
counterfactual assumption of perfect, costless governmental allocations.
168
 
If governmental allocations were costless, it would be possible to directly 
pursue  social welfare maximization rather than rely on market allocations.  
If we then introduced governmental costs into such a world—information 
costs, political costs, and so on—we might find that using markets ended up 
being a reasonable second-best solution for allocating many resources.  But 
we would count it as a cost of the system, and not a benefit, that its method 
of aggregating information through the price system directed resources to 
high valuers rather than to those who would derive the greatest welfare 
improvements from the resource.
169
   
 
C.  Why Stop at Access? 
 
I have centered my attention on resource access.  This focus might seem 
to replicate in some ways the problems I identify with a focus on 
transactions.  Just as transactions are only one way (and an imperfect and 
costly way) to structure access to resources, so too is resource access merely 
instrumental to the ultimate aim of resource use. Is something of 
consequence to legal scholars lost by focusing on resource access rather 
than resource use?   
The question, too, deserves more attention than I can give it here, but a 
few points are worth emphasizing. We can start with the empirical 
connection between optimizing access to resources and optimizing resource 
use.  There are two facets to this connection:  the degree to which access is 
a necessary precondition to optimal resource use, and the degree to which 
access is sufficient to induce optimal resource use.   
Access is sometimes necessary to optimal resource use in a rather 
visceral and clear-cut way.  If a given berry is best used as nutrition for Jed, 
it will be impossible for it to be deployed in that way without getting the 
berry into Jed’s stomach, which requires giving Jed access to the berry.  In 
other cases access is a practical necessity because the costs of arranging 
                                                 
168 See Schlag, supra note 8, at 1693-97.   
169 Schlag makes a related point when he observes that focusing on a costless market transaction "is really an 
invitation to look at certain forms of information that a market produces such as prices, payments, outputs, etc." 
and "to disregard other types of information—notably the kind that the government obtains such as votes, protests, 
expertise, etc."  Id. at 1695.   
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optimal resource use in its absence are too high.  Lloyd Cohen gives the 
example of a department store developer who would not need to worry 
about a holdout retaining ownership (or, presumably, physical possession) 
of what would be a corner of the store, if it were feasible to contract over 
the property's optimal use—here, as a seamlessly attached segment of the 
store.
170
   These two examples together suggest that access by high valuing 
end users is essential to optimal resource use, but access by parties involved 
in producing value for end users is only instrumental to that goal.  Whether 
to grant producers of value something less than physical access to inputs or 
something more (such as formal property rights) is thus an open and 
contingent question.  
Further, it is clear that access will not always be sufficient to ensure 
optimal resource use, either in production or consumption.  The step from 
resource access to resource use requires the essential ingredients of human 
effort and choice.  By and large, the law can only structure access to  
resources and set up incentive systems; it cannot directly compel uses.  The 
law can grant Jed access to a berry patch, but he must decide to pick the 
berries; it can grant him a bowl of berries, or a voucher for berries, but he 
must take additional steps to wring nutrition out of this arrangement.
171
 
Even when the government "itself" engages in a use, like using land for a 
highway, it is really only structuring access to the land, the paving 
equipment, and so on, and giving its human agents incentives to use these 
resources in a particular way.  It is not without justification, then, for law to 
focus on access, the tractable margin, rather than on inputs that it cannot 
directly control.   
Nonetheless, the gap between access and use is an interesting one for 
law, and it should not be neglected in examining how entitlement structures 
and other incentive systems operate.  One of the goals of this paper has been 
to view transactions instrumentally, and to see them as part of a larger set of 
resource access structures that includes, but is not limited to, private 
property rights.  Access, in turn, may be viewed instrumentally as well.  As 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales have shown, access can be used to 
elicit optimal investments in the absence of property rights, and sometimes 
this arrangement can dominate the residual rights associated with 
ownership.
172
  Here, access to production factors creates incentives that, 
ultimately, improve access to consumption items by end-users.  But end-
users too may require encouragement to use resources optimally.   
Informal or nonpecuniary methods of persuasion or coercion may 
become important in translating access into use. For example, rather than 
                                                 
170 Cohen, supra note 52, at 353.   
171 See Noah Zatz, Poverty Unmodified? Critical Reflections on the Deserving/Undeserving Distinction, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 550, 573-74 (2012) (discussing what it means for a resource like bread to be "available").   
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regulate access to water directly, the law might try to convince people that 
using too much water is shameful.  This would be an indirect method of 
trying to secure access to water for other users, or later versions of the same 
users.  Likewise, providing access to healthy foods or opportunities for 
exercise may be accompanied by exhortations to make use of these 
resources. Here the beneficiaries might be the individual's family, or the 
individual's future selves.  Viewing access instrumentally thus opens up 
new lines of inquiry.  For example, we might fruitfully investigate how 
certain access structures demand additional norms creation work to achieve 
the ultimate end of optimizing use, and the extent to which these norms, and 
their supporting structures, produce costs or benefits for society.
173




Regardless of exactly how the term is understood, “transaction costs” 
does a poor job of focusing legal scholars’ attention in all, and only, the 
right places. If transaction costs are worthy of special attention from legal 
scholars, it must be because they relate in some important way to legal 
processes, structures, entitlements, or institutions—dials that the law can 
twist. But if that is our criterion for paying special attention—legal 
remediability or tractability—then our attention must extend not just to the 
cost of transactions (however defined) but also to the costs of doing things 
through law that make transactions less costly or less necessary. Rather than 
taking center stage on their own, then, transaction costs are one of several 
cost factors implicated by resource access arrangements, and transactions 
are only one of several ways of structuring resource access.  At the same 
time, there is no reason to focus attention on costs that cannot be cost-
effectively reduced through the law’s dial-twisting, or to twist dials that are 
disconnected from the real problems at hand.   
To address the problems of underinclusion, overinclusion, and 
insufficient specification that have plagued the use of the transaction cost 
category, it is first necessary to widen our lens to take in all the costs of 
structuring access to resources.  The next step is to usefully subdivide this 
set of costs to home in on places where targeted legal interventions can 
improve resource access.  Emphasizing the distinction between conflict and 
coordination costs better frames the tradeoffs in entitlement design. 
Likewise, the distinction between blunt and costs and those produced by 
collective action problems helps to focus attention on the improvements for 
which property design has a comparative advantage.  
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Instead of reading Coase’s analysis as a directive to “use the law to 
lubricate private bargaining,”174 property scholars should be concerned with 
improving access to resources—including those resources that must be used 
to structure access to other resources. With the approach presented here, I 
hope to have made a start toward that goal.   
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